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INTRODUCTION 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.1 is a seminal case.  It 
marks the last time the Supreme Court performed a serious analysis of 
whether a group should be denominated a suspect class, and thus receive 
heightened judicial protection from discrimination.  At the same time, its 
application of a heightened variant of rational basis review, and its conclu-
sion that the challenged government action was based in “irrational preju-
dice,” has generated three decades of academic and judicial speculation 
about the conditions under which such heightened rational basis review 
would or should be performed.2  Cleburne has also served as a font of the 
Court’s emerging “animus” doctrine, which has been at least responsible 
for, among other things, the remarkable string of victories gay-rights plain-
tiffs have won at the Court over the last two decades.3 
And yet, important parts of this consequential case may have been acci-
dents—that is, they may have emerged as consequences not intended by a 
majority of the Justices.  Examination of several Justices’ papers4 reveals 
that the majority originally planned to decide only the suspect class ques-
tion, and to remand the case to the lower court for application of rational 
basis review.  It was only late in their deliberations—and late in the 1984–
 
 1 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 2 See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 525–26 (2004) 
(stating that the three-tiered section imposes rigorous judicial standards that apply under limited 
conditions); Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 605 (arguing that a statute’s ration-
ality cannot be evaluated without some concept of the goal that it was meant to further); Peter S. 
Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court Adopted a “Slid-
ing Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 477 n.14 
(1997) (explaining the deferential nature of the rational basis inquiry); Neelum J. Wadhwani, Ra-
tional Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 804 (2006) (explaining the parameters 
and nature of the rational basis test); John D. Wilson, Comment, Cleburne: An Evolutionary Step 
in Equal Protection Analysis, 46 MD. L. REV. 163, 185 (1986) (stating that under rational basis 
review the Court will normally uphold a statute that is applied unconstitutionally if it is constitu-
tional on its face); sources cited infra note 3. 
 3 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017); 
Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection From Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 
204 (labeling Cleburne as an animus precedent); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Ani-
mus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 908 (2012) (discussing animus as stereotype and fear in 
Cleburne).  See also Steven Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
675, 696–98 (2014) (recognizing but critiquing the animus idea). 
 4 This Article is based on an examination of the publicly-available papers of Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.  Most duplicative references are supported by citations 
to Justice Powell’s papers, which are the only papers of this group of Justices to have been made 
available online.  The papers of the other Justices are located in the Library of Congress.  Cita-
tions to those other Justices’ papers are provided where appropriate. 
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85 term—when Justice White, the author of Cleburne, was prevailed upon 
to add the final substantive section of what became the majority opinion, 
which actually performed the rational basis review it had called for, and 
struck down the government’s action on that basis. 
Those papers also reveal a late-erupting dispute between Justices White 
and Powell over whether that rational basis analysis ought to have resulted 
in a decision striking down the Cleburne ordinance on its face, or merely as 
applied to the plaintiffs’ particular group home.  The resolution of that dis-
pute ostensibly in favor of the latter approach helped create the more strin-
gent, record-based tone of the majority opinion’s rational basis analysis.  
Thus, the as-applied nature of the decision—a decision Justice White de-
fended as allowing municipalities more leeway to regulate5—helped color 
the opinion’s tone in a way that has since been interpreted as imposing 
stricter judicial review. 
These discoveries are important in themselves.6  But they also suggest 
interesting lessons about the path of the Court’s equal protection doctrine, 
the nature of that doctrine, and the overall predictability—or unpredictabil-
ity—of constitutional law more generally.  For these reasons, it bears inves-
tigating the Court’s deliberations and thinking about what the results sug-
gest, not just about Cleburne, and not just about equal protection, but about 
constitutional law and legal doctrine more generally. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I begins the Article by briefly 
recounting the Cleburne litigation.  Part II then mines the Justices’ records 
to recount their deliberations that led to the majority opinion we know to-
day.  Part II.A. considers the Justices’ decision to decide the rational basis 
 
 5 See infra text accompanying notes 150–152 and 182–186 (explaining Justice White’s concerns 
with a facial strike-down). 
 6 This is not the first piece of legal scholarship to publicize the fact that the first draft of Cleburne 
would have remanded the case.  Professor Earl Maltz noted this in 2014.  Earl M. Maltz, The 
Burger Court and the Conflict Over the Rational Basis Test: The Untold Story of Massachusetts 
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 39 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 264, 282 (2014).  Professor Maltz focused on 
the Justices’ deliberations in Cleburne as the culmination of their discussion of the meaning of 
rational basis review.  That discussion—and Professor Maltz’s focus—centers on earlier cases.  
This Article focuses more intensively on Cleburne, in which the Justices’ views about rationality 
review provided an important backdrop, see infra Part II.A.2., but were not front and center. 
  Other scholars have cited small portions of the Justices’ Cleburne papers as part of their exami-
nations of other, related, issues.  See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE 
BURGER COURT IN ACTION 251 (1990) (quoting Justice Powell’s view about tiered scrutiny in 
the context of the Court’s consideration of Cleburne); William N. Eskridge, Some Effects of 
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 2062, 2262–64 (2002); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protec-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 246 n.152 (1991) (quoting Schwartz); Mark V. Tushnet, The Su-
preme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967–1991: The View From the Marshall Papers, 36 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 536–37 (1995) (citing Justice Powell’s objection to Justice White’s 
definition of the two-tier structure in Cleburne).  None of these discussions focuses intensively 
on the deliberations in Cleburne itself. 
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issue, rather than remand the case to the lower court to do so.  It focuses in 
particular on the role of Justice William Rehnquist.  Justice Rehnquist in-
sisted that the Court decide the suspect class question Cleburne posed, in 
favor of finding that discrimination against the intellectually disabled mer-
ited only rational basis scrutiny.  But he was much more accommodating of 
Justice Powell’s desire to have the Court decide the ensuing rational basis 
question itself, rather than remand the case.  That combination of prefer-
ences, for which he found support in Justice O’Connor and Justice White 
himself, paved the way for White to accommodate Justice Powell’s prefer-
ence.  That dynamic, in turn, created the oddly-sequenced majority opinion, 
criticized by Justice Marshall in his partial dissent, in which the Court be-
gan by rejecting the plaintiffs’ suspect class argument but then continued 
on to hold that the challenged action violated the lower, default, rational 
basis standard. 
Part II.B. turns to the Justices’ deliberations on the facial/as-applied 
dispute.  It reveals that, in contrast to his accommodating stance on the re-
mand issue, Justice White held fast in his insistence on deciding the case on 
as-applied grounds, rather than striking the ordinance down on its face, as 
Justice Powell preferred.  Part II.B. then examines White’s rational basis 
analysis.  It concludes that that analysis rested uncomfortably on the as-
applied ground on which he successfully insisted.  While he squarely posed 
the issue in terms of the particular permit denial issued to the particular 
group home in question, much of his analysis did not focus on those partic-
ularities, but instead rested on the rationality vel non of the city’s discrimi-
nation against the intellectually disabled as a broad category of persons. 
Part III reconsiders the oddities and tensions revealed as the results of 
the intra-Court dynamics recounted in Part II, to determine whether they 
allow us to draw broader conclusions about the Court and its doctrine.  Part 
III.A. reconsiders Cleburne’s sequencing.  It suggests that Cleburne may 
reflect a dynamic related to public choice theory, in which the Court’s mul-
ti-member nature creates the possibility of logrolling, and results in the 
Court adopting an approach—here, the odd sequencing of its suspect class 
and rational basis analysis—that is both internally inconsistent and not ful-
ly reflective of the views of a majority of the Justices. 
Part III.B. reconsiders the facial/as-applied issue.  It begins by speculat-
ing that Justice White’s firmness on this issue might have derived from the 
fact that, at that point in the 1984–85 term, he was also drafting the Court’s 
opinion in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,7 a First Amendment case where he 
was defending the appropriateness of an as-applied, rather than facial, 
strike-down of a law alleged to violate the First Amendment.  If White’s 
 
 7 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
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concern for consistency between his opinions in these two contemporane-
ous cases does indeed help explain his views on the facial/as-applied issue, 
then it suggests that the broader content of the Court’s (and, indeed, a par-
ticular Justice’s) agenda may influence that Justice’s choices in particular 
cases. 
This Part also suggests that White was motivated by his desire to allow 
municipalities leeway to regulate living situations for the intellectually dis-
abled when the would-be residents were more profoundly disabled than the 
persons at issue in Cleburne.8  If this latter explanation provides all or part 
of the reason for White’s position, then, ironically, his attempt to perform 
an as-applied analysis, which almost necessarily implies recourse to the 
record, had the unintended effect of making his analysis appear to be an 
unusually stringent application of judicial review—the “rational basis with 
bite” that has come to be associated with Cleburne.  In other words, that 
unusually stringent rational basis scrutiny may have been an artifact of his 
choice on the  facial/as-applied issue—which itself may have derived from 
a desire to allow government more leeway to regulate. 
Part IV widens the lens even more broadly.  As Part IV notes, the story 
Cleburne tells is a straightforward one: the Court began by considering 
whether a group merits heightened judicial protection; concluded, essential-
ly, that the group came close but didn’t quite satisfy the requisites for that 
protection; but then, armed with the evidence from that near-miss, proceed-
ed to apply a more stringent version of rational basis scrutiny that yielded a 
win for that group. 
The problem is that the Justices’ papers reveal that this is not what hap-
pened.  Yet, we are left with a text—the opinion—that tells exactly that 
compelling (but incorrect) story.  Part IV concludes the Article by reflect-
ing on this oddity.  Given that what matters is the text of an opinion (rather 
than the deliberations that led to it), the example of Cleburne suggests that 
constitutional law doctrine—and, indeed, perhaps all legal doctrine—is 
more random than we might realize.  Particularized “accidents,” such as 
those recounted in Parts II and III, may influence particular parts of opin-
ions.  But when those components are combined into a text, the creation 
process of which (the Justices’ deliberations) is not easily available, and, at 
any rate, is not considered a valid interpretive aid,9 the result may be a 
compelling, but misleading story.  Yet that story may influence both law-
yers and lay consumers of the Court’s work-product in ways unintended by 
the Justices.  Such a story may especially influence those who teach the 
 
 8 This second explanation, which appears well-supported in the Justices’ papers, is not inconsistent 
with the first explanation—that is, both may have played a role in convincing Justice White to 
stand firm on this issue. 
 9 See infra note 224. 
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case, who may feel a special temptation or obligation to create coherent-
sounding narratives of constitutional doctrine for their students.  This latter 
phenomenon may be especially pernicious, as the repetition of a compel-
ling but inaccurate story eventually solidifies into an accepted, but inaccu-
rate, truth. 
I.  CLEBURNE 
Today, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cleburne is recognized as a wa-
tershed.  It marked the last time the Court performed a serious analysis of 
whether a group should be considered a suspect class.  The Court’s identi-
fication of serious judicial competence-based issues with so denominating 
the intellectually disabled, and its rejection of that status for that group, 
presaged the Court’s de facto abandonment of that approach to equal pro-
tection, even if that tradition continued on in lower federal courts and in 
state courts interpreting state constitutions’ equality provisions.10 
At the same time, its decision that the plaintiffs in that case were the 
victims of “irrational prejudice”11 had significant generative force.  In the 
immediate aftermath of Cleburne, lower courts engaged in a spate of 
heightened scrutiny of discrimination claims under the rational basis stand-
ard.12  Eventually, the Supreme Court picked up on the related ideas of 
heightened rational basis review and animus, employing such ideas in the 
gay rights cases beginning with Romer v. Evans13 and extending at least to 
United States v. Windsor14 and arguably to Obergefell v. Hodges.15  More 
 
 10 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (con-
cluding that sexual orientation discrimination requires “heightened scrutiny”); Varnum v. Brien, 
763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009) (concluding that “legislative classifications based on sexual 
orientation must be examined under a heightened level of scrutiny under the Iowa Constitution”). 
 11 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
 12 See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing an earlier case, 
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), as employing 
“active rational basis” based on Cleburne); Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 
1343, 1354–55 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying what the court called the “second order rational basis 
review” from Cleburne to handicapped persons denied admission to a federally funded housing 
project); Buttino v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 801 F.Supp. 298, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (apply-
ing “active heightened scrutiny” on the authority of Pruitt); Dubbs v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 
769 F.Supp. 1113, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (describing the heightened rational basis utilized in 
High Tech Gays); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F.Supp. 983, 988–97 (D. Kan. 1985) (applying what it 
called “second order rational basis review” from Cleburne and other cases to strike down a med-
ical malpractice statute). 
 13 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a Colorado referendum preventing municipalities from pro-
tecting people from discrimination due to sexual orientation violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 14 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 15 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (establishing a right to same-sex marriage pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concur-
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generally, the work of lower courts and the Supreme Court itself in build-
ing upon Cleburne has raised the prospect of a new type of equal protection 
review, one that is more granular, rather than focused on across-the-board 
heightened scrutiny for a particular type of discrimination.16  Finally, 
Cleburne gave new force to the idea, first broached a dozen years before in 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,17 that “a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically powerless minority”18 could not constitute a legitimate govern-
ment interest.  Indeed, Cleburne (with an assist from Moreno) can be un-
derstood as the font of what scholars now call the “animus” doctrine.19 
Thus, Cleburne was important, both in its turn away from suspect class 
analysis and its suggestion of a new way forward for equal protection law.  
As such, its analysis—and how the Court arrived at that analysis—bears 
consideration. 
A. The Background 
The Cleburne litigation had its origins in July, 1980, when Jan Hannah 
purchased the home at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas, a small 
community near Fort Worth, for use as a group home for approximately 
thirteen adults who suffered from mild or moderate intellectual disability.20  
Hannah was soon informed that the town’s zoning ordinance required that 
the facility, as a “hospital for the . . . feeble minded,” required a special use 
permit.21  Moreover, a different provision of the town’s zoning ordinance 
 
ring in the judgment) (employing heightened rational basis scrutiny to vote to strike town Tex-
as’s same-sex sodomy law). 
 16 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74–76 (2015) (discussing the Court’s 
modern sex discrimination jurisprudence as a more granular inquiry than the same across-the-
board heightened scrutiny of each and every sex classification); William D. Araiza, After the Ti-
ers: Windsor, Congressional Authority to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Poin-
tillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 394 (2014) (considering the implications of the 
Court’s similar granular scrutiny of sexual orientation discrimination for Congress’s power to en-
force the Equal Protection Clause). 
 17 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2693 (2013); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (1996) (all citing Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973), and discussing the concept of animus); see also Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584.  Obergefell 
is a tougher case to slot within the animus doctrine; nevertheless, at the very least the Court’s 
reasoning in that case was grounded on principles that could be gleaned from the earlier animus 
cases.  See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 3, at Chapter 12.  For scholarly discussions of animus, see 
sources cited supra note 3. 
 20 The judicial decisions and contemporary documents describe this condition as “mental retarda-
tion.”  That terminology is retained only in direct quotations from those documents. 
 21  Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, No. CA 3-80-1576-F, at ¶¶ 13, 15 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
16, 1982). 
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prohibited such a “hospital” in an area, like the one in which the Feather-
ston property was located, which was zoned R-3.  The town zoning com-
mission denied the special use permit in August of that year.  Two months 
later, the city council reaffirmed that denial.22 
After the city council’s action, Hannah, the entity she created to operate 
the home, an association comprised of and advocating for intellectually 
disabled persons, and other plaintiffs sued, alleging a variety of statutory 
and constitutional violations.23  Most relevantly for our purposes, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the city’s actions violated the equal protection rights of the 
would-be residents.  The district court rejected that claim.24  It acknowl-
edged that courts disagreed on whether intellectually disabled persons con-
stituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but the court concluded that they 
were not.  Thus, it upheld the city’s actions, even though that court found 
that among the factors the city council “considered” in its decision to deny 
the permit were both “the attitude of a majority of owners of property lo-
cated within two hundred . . . feet” of the home and “concern for the fears 
of elderly residents of the neighborhood.”25  It concluded that “[t]he loca-
tion of the group home raises many legitimate concerns with the city and its 
residents,” and that, “[s]ubjected to [the] limited standard of review” re-
quired by the rational basis standard, “the zoning ordinance as written and 
as applied to Plaintiffs[] is rationally related to legitimate purposes and in-
terests of the City of Cleburne.”26 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision on the equal pro-
tection issue.27  It concluded that the intellectually disabled satisfied the cri-
teria for heightened scrutiny, even if the conceded appropriateness of some 
differential treatment of that group rendered it only a quasi-suspect, rather 
than a fully suspect, class.  Applying that heightened scrutiny, the court 
held that the ordinance at issue was facially unconstitutional, and that the 
city council’s denial of the special use permit was also unconstitutional.  
The court dismissed as illegitimate several of the city’s justifications both 
for the ordinance and its denial of the particular permit for the Featherston 
home.  It acknowledged the legitimacy of other justifications it proffered, 
such as the prevention of both traffic congestion and fire hazards; however, 
 
 22 For details about those actions, see Dan Bodine, Proposed Retardation Facility Draws Fire, 
CLEBURNE TIMES-REVIEW, Aug. 19, 1980, at 1; Dan Bodine, Halfway House Filing Suit on De-
cision, CLEBURNE TIMES-REVIEW, Oct. 15, 1980, at 1. 
 23 See Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, No. CA3-30-1576-F (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div. 
1982), at 1–2 (identifying the plaintiffs). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 9–10. 
 26 Id. at 19–20. 
 27 Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 195–202 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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it found that neither the ordinance nor the council’s permit denial were suf-
ficiently related to those latter interests. 
B. At the Supreme Court 
The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, but on a different ground.  Writing 
for six Justices, Justice White began by considering, and rejecting, the low-
er court’s conclusion that the intellectually disabled constituted a quasi-
suspect class.  His analysis consisted of an uneasy mixture of direct conclu-
sions about the relevant differences distinguishing the intellectually disa-
bled from mainstream society and standard political process reasoning.  For 
example, he began his analysis by observing that the intellectually disabled 
“are . . . different, immutably so, in relevant respects,” from mainstream 
society.28  But he also noted that legislatures had enacted a variety of legis-
lation benefitting that group, and thus concluded that the democratic pro-
cess was in fact responsive to their needs.29 
Justice White concluded his suspect class analysis by a near-explicit 
confession of judicial inability to manage suspect class analysis if the Court 
granted the intellectually disabled suspect class status.  He observed that 
other groups—“the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm”30—
might, along with the intellectually disabled, share some characteristics of 
suspectness.  But exactly because those characteristics were relatively 
widely shared, he concluded that the Court should not grant that status to 
the plaintiffs, given the impossibility of justifying a decision to grant sus-
pect class status to the intellectually disabled while denying it to those oth-
er groups.31 
Despite that preliminary defeat, the plaintiffs nevertheless prevailed in 
the case.  When the Court proceeded to scrutinize the city’s actions under 
the rational basis standard, it concluded that they failed that scrutiny.32  As 
it had before the lower courts, the city offered several legitimate-sounding 
reasons for its decision, including concerns about flood evacuation, resi-
dential density, traffic congestion, and legal liability for the actions of the 
would-be residents.  The Court rejected those reasons, on the grounds that 
they did not justify the permit requirement for the group home in question 
while dispensing with that requirement for other land uses in that area, in-
cluding hospitals, convalescent homes, and fraternity houses.33  Notably, 
 
 28 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). 
 29 Id. at 443–44. 
 30 Id. at 445–46. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 447-50. 
 33  Id. 
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the Court based its conclusion about the ordinance’s poor fit with those 
concerns on a review of the record—a deviation from the normal rule that 
record-based justification is unnecessary in rational basis cases.34 
Another aspect of the Court’s approach also merits mention.  The Court 
began its rational basis scrutiny by stating that “the [City] Council was 
concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners lo-
cated within 200 feet of the [proposed] facility, as well as with the fears of 
elderly residents of the neighborhood.”35  The Court made short work of 
these (and similar36) sentiments, observing that “mere negative attitudes, or 
fear” were not “permissible bases” for the city’s differential treatment of 
the group home from “apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the 
like.”37  It is at least arguable that the Court’s identification of these (illegit-
imate) negative attitudes at the outset of its analysis set the stage for its 
closer-than-normal scrutiny of the city’s more legitimate justifications for 
its decision.  Indeed, Justice White implicitly pointed back to those illegit-
imate grounds at the end of his opinion, when he concluded that “[t]he 
short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an 
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”38 
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, joined the majority but 
also wrote a separate concurrence to express his continued disagreement 
with the entire enterprise of suspect class/tiered scrutiny analysis.39  De-
spite that disagreement, he joined Justice White’s opinion,40 concluding 
that “[t]he record convinces me that this permit was required because of the 
irrational fears of neighboring property owners, rather than for the protec-
tion of the mentally retarded persons who would reside in [the proposed] 
home.”41 
Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment only.42  Most of his opinion was de-
 
 34 See infra note 140 (citing cases applying the traditional, deferential version of rational basis re-
view). 
 35 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. 
 36 In the next paragraph, after rejecting the justifications discussed in the text, the Court rejected, on 
similar grounds, the argument that the proposed group home was located across the street from a 
junior high school.  See id. at 449. 
 37 Id. at 448. 
 38 Id. at 450. 
 39 Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 40 Chief Justice Burger never appears to have formally joined Justice White’s opinion, but it ap-
pears that his decision to join Justice Stevens’ opinion, which itself joined the majority, sufficed 
to have him counted as having joined the majority.  See id. at 433 (noting Chief Justice Burger as 
having joined the majority).  See also infra note 186 (clerk’s record of correspondence in the 
case, not noting any join letter from Burger). 
 41 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 42  Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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voted to arguing that the intellectually disabled did in fact constitute a sus-
pect class for which heightened scrutiny was appropriate.43  For our pur-
poses, however, what is most relevant about his opinion was his criticism 
of the Court’s decision to decide the suspect class question when it would 
eventually conclude that the city’s actions failed the default, rational basis, 
standard.  He described the majority’s methodology as a “‘two for the price 
of one’ approach to constitutional decisionmaking” that violated the 
Court’s normal practice of deciding only the issues necessary to resolve the 
case in front of it.44 
II.  THE JUSTICES’ DELIBERATIONS 
The records of several Justices reveal two aspects of the Court’s analy-
sis in Cleburne that suggest that its unusually stringent rational basis scru-
tiny arose either as an afterthought or a collateral consequence of its resolu-
tion of a different issue—phenomena this Article shorthands as “acci-
“accidents.”  First, the Court originally planned on remanding the case for 
the lower court to apply rational basis scrutiny, rather than applying it itself 
and deciding the case, as it eventually did.  While there had always been 
support on the Court for deciding rather than remanding the case,45 through 
the post-oral argument and initial opinion drafting phases that was a dis-
tinctly minority position, which a majority eventually accepted without 
recognizing the significance of that choice.  Second, the more muscular 
tinge to that rational basis scrutiny seems to have flowed in part from Jus-
tice White’s insistence on deciding the case on an as-applied, rather than a 
facial basis—a decision that in turn was motivated by a desire to give mu-
nicipalities more, not less, leeway to regulate group homes for the intellec-
tually disabled. 
These revelations are interesting in themselves.  But the fact that that 
unusually stringent scrutiny became Cleburne’s defining characteristic—
indeed, a characteristic that subsequently became quite influential46— 
makes them all the more important.  More generally, these revelations raise 
 
 43 While Justice Marshall did not specify whether he would have denominated the intellectually 
disabled a full-blown suspect class or a quasi-suspect class, his statement of the scrutiny he be-
lieved appropriate in this case—that the action “substantially further[] legitimate and important 
purposes,”—suggests intermediate review.  Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).  It should be noted, however, that he reached that conclusion based 
not just on the character of the group suffering the discrimination, but also on the nature of the 
right at issue—here, the right to establish a home. 
 44 Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 45 See text accompanying infra notes 52, 104, & 106. 
 46 See supra note 12; see also supra note 3 (citing sources noting Cleburne’s relevance to the 
Court’s animus doctrine). 
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interesting and important questions about the nature of constitutional law 
decision-making, and the path of constitutional law doctrine. 
A.  The Remand Question 
1.  The May 29 Draft 
Records of the Justices reveal that the analysis in Justice White’s origi-
nal draft opinion in Cleburne essentially concluded with the Court’s rejec-
tion of suspect class status for the intellectually disabled.47  That draft 
would have then remanded the case to the lower court for application of ra-
tional basis scrutiny.  His draft opinion, circulated to the conference on 
May 29, considered and rejected the plaintiffs’ argument for heightened 
scrutiny in Part III.  It then moved on to a short concluding section (Part 
IV) that first cautioned that “[o]ur refusal to recognize the retarded as a 
quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious 
discrimination,” and reminded readers that the rational basis standard both 
prohibited “arbitrary [and] irrational” distinctions and ruled out “some ob-
jectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group’—” as “legitimate state interests.”48 
Second, that final section of the draft explained why it was appropriate 
for the Court to have the Court of Appeals apply the rational basis standard 
in the first instance.  In support of that tentative decision, the draft noted 
that that lower court had not yet had an opportunity to apply that standard, 
since it had settled on intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of re-
view.49  The draft also observed that the State of Texas had submitted an 
amicus brief to the Court, arguing both that the city’s permit denial violated 
state mental health law, and that the city lacked the authority to make zon-
ing decisions based on the capacity of intellectually disabled persons to live 
in a group home.50  The draft concluded that this “‘ambiguity in state law’” 
“‘cloud[ed]’” the issue sufficiently to warrant giving the lower court the 
opportunity to address these questions, which had not been raised before 
that court.51 
 
 47 See, e.g., Papers of J. Lewis Powell in No. 84-468, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1581 [hereinafter Powell Papers] (includ-
ing Justice White’s May 29 draft). 
 48 Powell Papers, supra note 47, First Draft 12-13 (May 29, 1985) [hereinafter May 29 Draft] 
(quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 49  Id. at 13. 
 50  Id. at 13 n.14. 
 51 Id. at 13. 
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2.  Antecedents Of The Remand Decision 
The May 29 draft’s decision to remand the case to the Fifth Circuit did 
not appear out of the blue.  Both Justice Powell’s and Justice Blackmun’s 
post-oral argument conference notes reveal majority support on the Court 
for that decision.  Both Justices’ notes indicate that Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor supported a reversal 
of the Fifth Circuit’s suspect class decision and a remand to that court to 
apply the rational basis test.52 
Thus, the draft’s remand decision seemed to enjoy the initial support of 
a five-Justice majority.  Of the remaining four Justices, three—Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun—would have affirmed the lower court’s conclu-
sion that the intellectually disabled merited explicitly heightened scrutiny.  
The final Justice—Stevens—supported a decision affirming the lower 
court’s result on a rational basis ground; however, according to Justice 
Powell’s notes, he also believed that the ordinance would “clearly” be inva-
lid if it was subjected to heightened scrutiny.53 
a.  The Crisis of Suspect Class Analysis 
The support for the remand option should not be surprising, even if it 
would have mooted the heightened rational basis review for which 
Cleburne is known today.  As explained below,54 the Justices in Cleburne 
 
 52 See Papers of J. Harry A. Blackmun in No. 84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Box 428, Folder 1) [hereinafter Blackmun Papers] (reflect-
ing these fives justices’ preferences from the Court’s April 26 conference, and including the no-
tation “5=RR”); Powell Papers, supra note 43, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (reflecting the-
se five justices’ preferences from the Court’s March 20 conference).  Based on examination of 
his papers, “RR” appears to have been Justice Blackmun’s shorthand for “reverse and remand.”  
Justice Powell’s notes, in addition to reflecting a preference for a remand, also indicate that he 
could also have supported the Court itself affirming the result on a rational basis ground; Justice 
Blackmun’s notes indicate the same openness on the part of Justice O’Connor.  See Powell Pa-
pers, supra note 43, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985); Blackmun Papers, supra. 
  In addition to this evidence, at oral argument the attorney for group home was asked why it 
didn’t make sense to remand the case, with another justice expressing agreement with that idea.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Cleburne v, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84-468), 1985 U.S. Trans. 
LEXIS 54; id. at 41-42; Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84-
468), 1985 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 93; id. at 27.  Justice Powell’s notes indicate that that questioner 
was Justice White, and that it was Justice Rehnquist who agreed with that suggestion.  See Pow-
ell Papers, supra note 47.  It should be noted that the case was argued twice apparently because 
of an illness that kept Justice Powell off the bench for the first oral argument.  See Eskridge, su-
pra note 6, at 2263; see also E-mail from Renea Hicks, attorney for Cleburne plaintiffs, to author 
(Mar. 8, 2016) (on file with author).  In light of the 4-4 split that seemed likely after the March 
argument, it is not surprising that the Court scheduled reargument in the case. 
 53 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes 2 (Mar. 20, 1985) (reflecting Justice Stevens’s 
belief that the ordinance would “clearly” be invalid). 
 54 See infra Parts II.A.3. and III.A. 
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were far more focused on the suspect class question that case posed, and 
less interested in the proper outcome of any rational basis review of the 
city’s actions.  Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that 
Cleburne came at a crisis point of suspect class analysis.  After a decade of 
experimentation, a variety of difficulties with suspect class analysis had be-
come manifest by the mid-1980s.  Some of those problems were acknowl-
edged at the start of this period.  For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson,55 
an early exemplar of suspect class analysis, Justice Brennan, seeking to ex-
plain why some classifications that otherwise satisfied his criteria for sus-
pectness should not be granted that status, argued that suspect classifica-
tions, in addition to their other characteristics, also “frequently bear[] no 
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”56  Of course, as 
commentators have recognized, such an overt recourse to the relevance of 
the classification to a legitimate government interest contradicted the prom-
ised value neutrality and process orientation of suspect class analysis.57 
Such recourse to the substantive reasonableness of the classification—
and thus vulnerability to claims of Lochner-izing58 equal protection law59—
also arose in the context of distinguishing between suspect classes and sus-
pect classifications, and, by extension, in determining what conduct consti-
tuted discrimination against whom.  For example, in Craig v. Boren, the 
Court struck down an Oklahoma law barring the sale of low-alcohol beer to 
young males but allowing such sale to females of the same age.60  In dis-
sent, Justice Rehnquist wondered, among other things, why the Court was 
solicitous of discrimination against males, given their presumed lack of 
suspect class status according to the standard political process-based crite-
ria.61  The Court’s response, intimated only in a footnote, was that such 
seemingly favorable treatment of females reflected demeaning and oppor-
tunity-limiting stereotypes about female fragility and meekness.62 
 
 55 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 56 Id. at 686.  Justice Brennan identified “intelligence” and “physical disability” as examples of 
classifications that were in fact relevant in the way he explained, and thus did not merit suspect 
class status.  Id. 
 57 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Reistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 787 (1991) (using similar terminology); id. at 787 n.171 (citing other scholars’ similar 
arguments). 
 58 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 59 See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 6, at 268 (quoting a draft concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist in 
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), in which he referred to “the history of 
this Court’s half century of adjudication ending in 1940” as a caution against overly-careful ra-
tional basis review). 
 60 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 61 Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. at 202 n.14 (majority opinion). 
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Craig did not constitute the first instance of the Court having to deter-
mine what exactly constituted sex discrimination, or, more precisely, dis-
crimination against women.  In particular, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s sex 
equality campaign for the ACLU in the 1970s often selected male plain-
tiffs, in order to press the point that sexual stereotyping injured both men 
and women, and that, as in Craig, the sex discrimination the Court should 
care about often ostensibly benefitted women.63  For our purposes, the im-
portant point is that the stereotyping argument forced Justices to go beyond 
straightforward application of value-neutral political process reasoning, and 
make substantive judgments about which types of differential treatment 
constituted invidious (or at least potentially invidious) discrimination. 
Other problems with suspect class analysis also manifested during this 
period.  In 1978, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,64 Jus-
tice Powell forcefully rejected the applicability of Carolene Products-style 
political process analysis to the question of the degree of scrutiny appropri-
ate for race-based affirmative action programs.65  While he was only one 
Justice, four of his colleagues were perceived to have been even more hos-
tile to affirmative action than he was; thus, his rejection of a political pro-
cess rationale for less-than-strict scrutiny did not bode well for the migra-
tion of such analysis into the area of race.66  A decade later, the Court 
firmly rejected such analysis, without giving it particularly serious consid-
eration.67  The Court’s rejection of political process reasoning in race cas-
es—the context where Justice Stone likely intended it to primarily apply, 
and that constituted the most pressing concern of equal protection in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century—quite likely helped blunt the 
 
 63 See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination 
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 84–88 (2010). 
 64 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 65 Id. at 290–99 (opinion of Powell, J.); see also Klarman, supra note 6, at 310–11 (noting the ten-
sion in affirmative action jurisprudence between the political process model of equal protection 
and the model that deems any government use of certain characteristics presumptively unconsti-
tutional regardless of how political process theory would treat it). 
 66 It is true that Justice Stevens, one of the members of this more hostile bloc in Bakke, eventually 
grew more accommodating to affirmative action.  See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242–
45 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for more latitude for race-based affirmative action 
policies, and explicitly distinguishing such policies, in terms of their invidiousness, from Jim 
Crow legislation).  Nevertheless, during his early years on the Court he appeared far less accept-
ing of government uses of race.  See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that racial definitions for purposes of affirmative action set-
asides might parallel those found in the Nazi race laws). 
 67 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).  This part of Croson was a plu-
rality, gaining the assent only of four Justices.  Id. at 476, 493.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence, 
however, rejected the constitutionality of such plans with even more force, and thus by necessary 
implication rejected a political process rationale for less than strict scrutiny.  Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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momentum toward its further expansion. When combined with Justice 
Brennan’s failure in Frontiero to find a fifth vote for a political-process ra-
tionale for according heightened scrutiny to sex classifications, the Bakke 
majority’s rejection of an analogous rationale in the context of race surely 
did not bode well for that approach to equal protection. 
Finally, political process analysis was plagued by a more prosaic, but 
still important, problem: the difficulty of actually applying the history of 
discrimination, immutability/irrelevance, and current political powerless-
ness criteria Justice Brennan had set forth in Frontiero.68  As noted earli-
er,69 even in Frontiero itself Justice Brennan was forced to acknowledge 
that immutability was not a foolproof criterion for suspect class status, giv-
en the reality that many immutable criteria were in fact quite reasonable 
classification tools.70  Other cases also indicated that Brennan’s approach 
suffered from similar complexities.  For example, in Mathews v. Lucas,71 
the Court was forced to acknowledge, in the context of legitimacy discrim-
ination, the necessarily-nuanced answers to the questions Justice Brennan’s 
criteria posed.  In Mathews, the Court conceded that legitimacy (the status 
of being born out of wedlock) was an immutable condition that was irrele-
vant to persons’ abilities to contribute to society.72  Nevertheless, it con-
cluded that children born out of wedlock did not merit “extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process,” in part because 
“discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or 
pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against 
women and Negroes.”73  Such a statement suggested at least the possibility 
of a multi-tiered, and perhaps even a sliding scale approach to the level of 
scrutiny appropriate for a given type of classification, with all the uncer-
tainty attending such methodologies.74 
 
 68 See Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring) (setting 
forth these criteria). 
 69 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 70 In addition, the argument that immutability is not, in most cases, a physical law of nature, but 
potentially socially constructed, eventually arose in the academic commentary about equal pro-
tection.  See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CON. LAW 646 
(2001) (proposing a theory by which the immutability prong of suspect class analysis should be 
understood as referring to socially-constructed notions of which traits are immutable). 
 71 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
 72 Id. at 505. 
 73 Id. at 506 (internal quotations omitted from first quotation). 
 74 To be sure, Mathews itself declined to adopt or apply a multi-tiered approach to equal protection.  
Rather, the Court’s ambivalence about rational basis review in the 1970s, see infra text accom-
panying notes 80–87, allowed it to insist that even such low-level review required a non-trivial 
showing from of the government.  See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505 (citing cases where the level of 
scrutiny applicable in Mathews nevertheless resulted in the rejection of arbitrary classifications); 
id. at 510 (stating that such scrutiny is not “toothless”); but see id. (insisting that the challenger 
bore the burden of demonsrating the “insubstantiality” of the relationship between the challenged 
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Justice Rehnquist, the decade’s most vocal opponent of expanding the 
list of suspect classifications, made similar points, but more caustically.  He 
protested, in the context of the Court’s consideration of alienage classifica-
tions, that it didn’t take enormous ingenuity to craft arguments for suspect 
status for a large variety of classifications.75  Relatedly, in his Craig dissent 
he criticized the components of intermediate scrutiny as “so diaphanous 
and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating 
to particular types of legislation.”76  His critique further highlighted the 
malleability and vagueness of both Justice Brennan’s criteria and the multi-
tiered scrutiny structure it generated. 
This is not to say that suspect class doctrine was a dead letter at the 
Court by 1985.  Certainly, the Court’s liberals remained interested in con-
sidering expanding the list of suspect classes.  Beyond Cleburne itself, this 
willingness is reflected in Justice Brennan’s dissent from the denial of cert. 
in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District.77  Rowland dealt with a 
school district’s discrimination against a bisexual teacher.  Only a month 
before the Court’s first argument in Cleburne, Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justice Marshall, dissented from that cert. denial, criticizing the Court for 
refusing to consider whether sexual orientation should be a suspect class.  
Making no secret of his view on that question, he also provided a skeletal 
political process-based argument in favor of suspect class status.78 
Thus, the conceptual difficulties with suspect class analysis had become 
sufficiently clear by 1985 that it was perhaps unsurprising that the 
Cleburne majority saw its main task as cutting off further expansion of the 
list of suspect classifications.  At the same time, as implied by Justice 
Brennan’s cert. denial dissent in Rowland, enough sentiment for further ex-
pansion remained that, again, the majority might have viewed the main 
question in Cleburne to be the fate of suspect class analysis.  Indeed, both 
times the Court met to discuss Cleburne, Brennan and Marshall, now 
 
classification and a legitimate government interest).  Nevertheless, Mathews was eventually cited 
as support for the proposition that legitimacy classifications merited an intermediate position in 
the Court’s eventual three-tiered scrutiny structure.  See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 75 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  In addition to being 
caustic, his critique was prescient, given that Justice White’s final explanation in Cleburne for 
denying heightened scrutiny to the intellectually disabled reflected similar concerns about the 
lack of principled limits to decisions to denominate groups as suspect or quasi-suspect.  See su-
pra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
 76 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 77 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). 
 78 Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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joined by Justice Blackmun, spoke in favor of according heightened scruti-
ny to the city’s actions.79 
b.  The Struggle Over Rational Basis Review 
But the fate of suspect class analysis was not the only question that 
might have been on the Justices’ minds as they considered Cleburne.  A 
separate, but related, issue confronting them in 1985 was the fate of ration-
al basis review.  Cleburne arose in the aftermath of an almost two decade-
long debate among the Justices about such review.80  By the late 1960s the 
Court had begun striking down laws as violating equal protection without 
explicitly disturbing the ostensible doctrinal structure under which all clas-
sifications other than racial ones received the same, minimal judicial scru-
tiny.  Beginning with legitimacy classification in a pair of 1968 cases,81 and 
then continuing with sex classifications beginning in 1971,82 the Court had 
begun to deviate from that rigid two-tiered model of equal protection.  This 
evolution was noticed by legal scholars, most notably Gerald Gunther, who 
discussed it in his influential Harvard Law Review Foreword in 1972.83  In 
turn, Gunther’s analysis (and praise) of this development was noted by in-
dividual Justices, who relied on his analysis as support for attempting to 
further extend the scope of this more muscular rationality review.84 
By the mid to late 1970s, the Justices’ discussions had progressed to the 
point where they were openly debating the appropriate sharpness of ration-
al basis scrutiny.  For example, in 1976, in Craig v. Boren, Justice Powell 
explicitly suggested that “the relatively deferential ‘rational basis’ standard 
of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a 
gender-based classification.”85  Justice Powell was responding to a majority 
opinion that he understood as likely to be read as adopting an intermediate 
level of scrutiny for the type of classification at issue (those based on sex).  
 
 79 See Powell Papers, supra note 47; see also Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (making, in his notes 
of the March 20 conference, the notation “3 HS +”).  Examination of his papers suggests that 
“HS” was his shorthand for “heightened scrutiny,” and “+” his shorthand for affirmance. 
 80 For a more detailed exposition of this debate, see generally Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Cross-
roads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (2014); Maltz, supra 
note 6. 
 81 Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968). 
 82 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 83 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
 84 See Eyer, supra note 80, at 550–51 (citing Justice Powell’s attempt in his abortive opinion in 
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), to rely heavily on Gunther’s analysis). 
 85 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (addressing gender-based 
classification). 
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Justice Powell’s approach was not necessarily a matter of opposition to ex-
plicit recognition that sex discrimination required more heightened scruti-
ny.  Instead, as Professors Earl Maltz and Katie Eyer have each recently re-
counted, Justices Powell and Brennan worked over the course of several 
years in the mid-to-late 70s to convince the Court to adopt an approach to 
rational basis scrutiny that was more stringent than the toothless review that 
had come to prevail during the Warren Court’s reaction to the perceived 
excesses of the Lochner era.86  That effort covered not just cases involving 
allegedly-suspect classes; rather, both justices made clear that they were 
advocating for a tougher understanding of rational basis review even in 
contexts involving garden-variety social and economic regulation.87 
Leading the opposition to this effort was Justice Rehnquist, who con-
sistently insisted on keeping equal protection rational basis review excep-
tionally deferential.88  Indeed, as Katie Eyer has persuasively argued, that 
imperative influenced him strongly enough to prompt him to characterize 
the Court’s review in Craig as a new, intermediate, level of scrutiny.  Ac-
cording to Eyer, Rehnquist’s goal in making that move—counter-intuitive 
as it might seem for someone who opposed extending heightened scrutiny 
to new groups89—was to immunize rational basis review from the more 
muscular scrutiny in Craig, by describing Craig as introducing an entirely 
new level of equal protection scrutiny, one limited to a circumscribed cate-
gory of cases.90 
Eventually, Justice Rehnquist triumphed, with the Court by and large 
continuing to embrace a very deferential understanding of garden-variety 
equal protection rationality review.91  But while Justices Powell and Bren-
 
 86 See generally Maltz, supra note 6 (describing Justice Brennan and Justice Powell’s efforts to 
develop a stricter form of rational basis review); see also Eyer, supra note 80, at 549–551 (noting 
Justice Powell’s attempt in Murgia to set forth a more rigorous approach to rational basis review 
as a general matter). 
 87 See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 239–47 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (applying a more 
discerning form of rational basis scrutiny to the allocation of SSI benefits to certain individuals); 
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183–84 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (endorsing a more 
stringent rational basis standard to the unequal award of retirement benefits based on seniority 
status); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 88 See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 6, at 267–68 (recounting Justice Rehnquist’s strong opposition to the 
more muscular rational basis scrutiny suggested in early drafts of the Court’s opinion in Murgia); 
see also Fritz, 449 U.S. at 175–77 (insisting on highly deferential judicial review under the ra-
tional basis test). 
 89 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649–54 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (oppos-
ing heightened scrutiny for alienage classifications); Weber v. Aetna, 406 U.S. 164, 177–82 
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (opposing the more careful review the Court accorded a legiti-
macy classification). 
 90 Eyer, supra note 80, at 533; see also Maltz, supra note 6, at 267–68 (citing similar sentiments 
Justice Rehnquist expressed to his colleagues during the Court’s deliberations on Murgia). 
 91 See Fritz, 449 U.S 166 (six-Justice majority adopting Justice Rehnquist’s highly deferential for-
mulation of the rational basis test).  A little over a decade later, the Court was nearly unanimous 
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nan ultimately failed in making such review more stringent, the issue re-
mained undecided in 1985.  Indeed, in the few years prior, the Court decid-
ed several equal protection cases where the majority’s ostensible applica-
tion of rational basis review was viewed by many as more stringent than 
the classic, toothless scrutiny featured in such canonical cases as Railway 
Express v. New York92 and Williamson v. Lee Optical.93 
This backdrop makes clear that, in Cleburne, the prospect of relatively 
more stringent rational basis review remained a viable option, with multiple 
supporters on the Court.94  And, indeed, at least some Justices were already 
 
in embracing an extremely deferential version of rational basis scrutiny.  In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
505 U.S. 1, 3–18 (1992), Justice Blackmun wrote for seven Justices upholding an acquisition-
value property tax valuation scheme under very deferential rational basis review.  Justice Thomas 
concurred, arguing for an even more deferential approach.  Id. at 25–28 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Only Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued for more careful scrutiny.  Id. at 28–31.  The next year in 
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 309–17 (1993), Justice Thomas wrote for eight 
Justices (with Justice Stevens again the outlier, id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring)) in upholding 
a television satellite regulation, again employing very deferential review.  After the early 1980s, 
the only garden-variety equal protection case resulting in a loss for the government was the unan-
imous opinion authored by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. Com-
mission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 344–46 (1989).  At first blush it might appear ironic 
that Rehnquist (by then the Chief Justice) authored Allegheny County.  But the irony disappears 
when one realizes that, as Chief Justice, he would have had the power to assign the majority 
opinion, and that he might well have assigned it to himself in order to ensure that the opinion was 
written in a limited fashion. 
 92 336 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1949). 
 93 348 U.S. 483, 484 (1955).  But see Hooper v. Bernalillo County, 472 U.S. 612, 618–23 (1982) 
(holding that a New Mexico tax exemption statute benefitting some veterans but not others vio-
lated equal protection); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–30 (1982) (holding that a state law 
denying education to undocumented children was irrational and thus violated equal protection); 
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 55–65 (1982) (finding that Alaska dividend distribution plan vi-
olates the Equal Protection Clause because it irrationally distinguished between citizens who es-
tablished their residence before 1959 and those who did so afterward).  Perhaps reflecting this 
lack of consensus, Justice Blackmun’s notes of the April 26 conference appear to attribute the 
following statement or viewpoint to Justice Stevens: “we here [or have] no agree on rational ba-
sis.”  Blackmun Papers, supra note 52. 
 94 In addition to Brennan and Powell, as noted earlier in the text, Justice Stevens indicated that he 
might have viewed the Cleburne ordinance as failing his own understanding of rational basis re-
view.  See Powell Papers, supra note 47; see also infra note 96.  And, indeed, his concurrence, 
joined by Chief Justice Burger, embraced such a view.  Nor was this the only time Justice Ste-
vens voted based on this more stringent understanding of what equal protection required in a 
garden-variety case of social and economic regulation.  See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180.  Moreover, 
the Cleburne Court itself relied on then-recent stringent applications of rational basis review.  In 
particular, the May 29 draft cited a 1982 case featuring such review as support for the proposi-
tion that “[t]he State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so 
attenuated as to render that distinction arbitrary or irrational.”  May 29 Draft, supra note 44 (cit-
ing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61–63 (1982)). 
  In addition to Justice Stevens, at least one other justice was perceived by Justice Blackmun as 
amenable to the Court deciding the case by affirming the Fifth Circuit’s result on a rationality 
ground.  See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (including the 
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thinking in those terms when Cleburne came to the Court.  What appear to 
be Justice Powell’s notes on his law clerk’s bench memo indicate that he 
(Powell) was open to the argument that the city’s permit denial failed ra-
tional basis scrutiny.95  Justice Powell’s conference notes also suggest that 
Justice Stevens believed that the city’s permit denial should fail, under his 
own, unified, standard of equal protection review.96  Justice Brennan be-
lieved, at least from the date of the post-argument conference, that the in-
tellectually disabled constituted a suspect class;97 thus, his views on the ra-
tional basis question are unknown.  Interestingly, Justice Powell’s notes 
indicate that even Justice Rehnquist was not sure the city’s actions could 
satisfy rationality review.98 
3. The Remand Discussion 
It was against this backdrop that the Court considered Cleburne in the 
spring of 1985.  As noted earlier, Justices Powell’s and Blackmun’s confer-
ence notes reveal that five Justices (Burger, White, Rehnquist, Powell, and 
O’Connor) favored a remand to the lower court to apply rational basis re-
view,99 of whom three (Rehnquist, Powell, and O’Connor) suggested the 
ordinance could not satisfy.100  Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, when Justice 
 
notation “2 rationality +”). The record suggests that he might have had in mind either Justice 
Powell or Justice O’Connor. 
 95 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J., 4 (Mar. 5, 
1985) (depicting the handwritten notation “I agree” next to the memo’s statement, underlined in 
the same color as the notation, that “the City’s action can be held unconstitutional as applied un-
der the rational relationship test”). 
 96 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (containing Justice Ste-
vens’ notes of March 20 conference indicating his position on rational basis review); see also 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 97 See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985); Powell Papers, supra 
note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985). 
 98 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985).  Justice Blackmun’s notes 
are not as clear on Rehnquist’s position.  The only clue is that his notes of Rehnquist’s position at 
the April 26 conference conclude with what appears to read “cd go to JPS?”  Blackmun Papers, 
supra note 52, Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985).  If that notation means that Rehnquist would 
have considered joining an opinion written by Justice Stevens, that would support Justice Pow-
ell’s notes of the March 20 conference, since Justice Stevens believed that the Court should strike 
the city’s action down on a rational basis ground. 
 99 See supra note 52 (including the Justices’ notes regarding rational basis review). 
100 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (indicating that Powell, 
Rehnquist, and O’Connor thought the ordinance might fail rational basis scrutiny); but see 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (counting only two votes for 
the proposition that the ordinance failed rational basis scrutiny).  Justice Blackmun’s notes seem 
to suggest that Justice Powell did not actively participate in the March 20 conference or did not 
speak.  This would make sense given that he was ill at the time and did not participate in the oral 
argument.  See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 2263; E-mail from Renea Hicks, supra note 52.  This 
would also explain the discrepancy in vote-counting between the two Justices.  Nevertheless, 
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White circulated the first draft of that opinion, on May 29, it focused al-
most exclusively on rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the intel-
lectually disabled merited explicitly heightened scrutiny. 
The draft concluded with a short section remanding the case to the Fifth 
Circuit to apply the rational basis standard.  That section noted that that 
standard gave the government the latitude it needed to respond to the needs 
of that group.  But, perhaps hinting at the concerns expressed by some of 
the Justices,101 it also cautioned that, even under such review, the “relation-
ship” to the “asserted goal” of the statute must not be “so attenuated as to 
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”102  Addressing the other com-
ponent of rational basis scrutiny, the draft also warned that “some objec-
tives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically powerless group’—
are not legitimate state interests.”103  Observing that the Court of Appeals 
had not applied rational basis scrutiny, given its conclusion that intermedi-
ate scrutiny was the proper standard, and noting that the issue was “cloud-
ed” by a state law question that had not been presented originally, the draft 
would have remanded the case. 
On June 3, five days after Justice White circulated his draft, there was a 
flurry of activity in the case.  Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion, Justice 
Brennan wrote that he would “await the dissent,” and, perhaps most signif-
icantly of all, Justice Stevens wrote to reiterate his view that the Court 
should decide the merits of the case rather than remanding.104  While it was 
probably not surprising, Justice Stevens’ communication confirmed that at 
 
Powell’s own notes provide extensive commentary on his own position, and suggest he was a 
third vote in the remand bloc for the possibility that the ordinance would fail rational basis scru-
tiny. 
  Justice Blackmun’s April 26 conference notes indicate that he counted five votes in favor of re-
versing and remanding.  See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985).  
Those notes also suggest that Justices Powell and O’Connor harbored doubts about the ordi-
nance’s ability to survive rational basis, with Justice O’Connor open to the possibility of affirm-
ing the Fifth Circuit’s decision on a rational basis ground, rather than remanding.  Interestingly, 
Blackmun records Justice Rehnquist as saying, “cd go to JPS?”—presumably meaning that he 
could see himself joining an opinion by Justice Stevens.  Throughout the Justices’ deliberations 
Justice Stevens favored affirming the Fifth Circuit on a rational basis ground.  See Powell Papers, 
supra note 43, March 20 conference notes; see also Blackmun Papers, supra note 46, Conference 
Notes (Mar. 20, 1985); id. at Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985). 
101 See supra note 100 (noting particular Justices’ doubts that the city’s actions satisfied even ration-
al basis review). 
102 May 29 Draft, supra note 48, at 12. 
103 Id. at 13 (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).  The Court also observed that 
any substantive rights the plaintiffs had been deprived of remained subject to judicial protection 
as well.  Id. 
104 See Powell Papers, supra note 47 (including letters from Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, and Ste-
vens); Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (same).  Justice O’Connor joined Justice White’s opinion 
the next day.  See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June 
4, 1985). 
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least four members of the Court—the three Justices (Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun) who urged the application of heightened scrutiny, and Jus-
tice Stevens himself—would call for deciding the case, rather than remand-
ing it.105 
These developments put Justice Powell in the familiar position of swing 
vote, given his earlier-noted106 ambivalence about remanding or deciding 
the case.  Two days later, he wrote Justice White, urging that the Court de-
cide the case, and do so on rational basis grounds, rather than remanding 
the case for consideration of the rational basis argument.107  Importantly, 
after laying out his argument for the Court itself to strike the law down on 
rational basis grounds, he then offered that, if the Court adopted his sugges-
tion, “[i]t would then be unnecessary to consider the quasi-suspect class 
question.”108 
Focusing for now on the remand issue,109 perhaps the most interesting 
repercussion of Justice Powell’s June 5 letter is the reaction it generated 
from Justice Rehnquist.  That same day, Rehnquist wrote to White to urge 
rejection of Powell’s suggestion that the Court jettison the May 29 draft’s 
analysis of the suspect class issue.  After then restating his support for the 
draft’s remand result, he continued: “but it would not bother me greatly to 
see the Court opinion decide the validity of the ordinance under the rational 
basis test.”110 
Justice Rehnquist’s willingness to decide the case on rational basis 
grounds is a surprise.  As scholars have noted after examining both his 
opinions and his internal communications at the Court, Justice Rehnquist 
was a leading force for adopting an extremely deferential brand of ration-
ality review.111  Just five years before Cleburne, in Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz,112 his majority opinion sharply engaged Justice Brennan’s 
dissent urging a more muscular level of rationality review.113  Given the 
 
105 But see Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (indicating that as of the March 20 conference there 
were five votes for deciding the case: two votes for affirming the Fifth Circuit’s result for the 
plaintiffs, but on a rational basis ground, in addition to the three votes who would have applied 
heightened scrutiny and affirmed on that basis). 
106 See supra note 52. 
107 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985). 
108 Id.  Justice Powell’s letter also introduced another issue into the Court’s deliberation—the dis-
tinction between invalidating the law on its face, as opposed to applied.  This issue is treated later 
in this Article.  See infra Part II.B. 
109 Cf. Letter from Powell, J. to White, J., supra note 107 (introducing the facial/as-applied issue 
into the justices’ deliberations). 
110 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985). 
111 See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 86; Maltz, supra note 6; Saphire, supra note 2 (describing Justice 
Rehnquist as “a leading proponent for an exceptionally deferential rational bas[i]s standard”). 
112 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
113 See id. at 176 n.10. 
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seeming strength of his preference, it is striking to see him in Cleburne 
casually remarking that “it would not bother [him] greatly” to see the Court 
use “the rational basis test” to decide this case.114 
To be sure, Justice Rehnquist may not have thought that such a decision 
would in fact go against the city—it’s possible that he foresaw Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice O’Connor rejecting that outcome, with the result 
that a rational basis strike-down would be embraced only by a minority of 
the Court (Powell, Stevens, and possibly White115).  Nevertheless, it bears 
remembering that he did not dissent from the heightened rational-basis re-
view expressed in the final Court opinion.  In terms of pure results, such a 
dissent might not have mattered: between the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun 
bloc that would have struck down the city’s action as failing heightened 
scrutiny and the nascent Powell-Stevens position favoring a rational basis 
strike-down, five votes existed for the plaintiffs.116 
But such a dissent might have mattered in terms of methodology.  Even 
though the final opinion garnered six votes, and thus did not depend on 
Rehnquist’s assent, two of those six votes (Stevens, joined by Burger) ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the entire idea of tiered scrutiny.117  Thus, if he 
had defected from the rational-basis part of Justice White’s opinion, only 
three Justices would have fully subscribed to the combination of the tiered 
scrutiny structure and a muscular application of the lowest level of scruti-
ny.  If Justice Rehnquist had dissented on that latter point, his opinion 
could have pointed out the lack of consensus within the majority, and 
would have set the stage for his continued campaign against a more search-
ing version of rational basis review.  But yet he did not dissent.118 
Why not?  One obvious possibility—which we should not discount—is 
that he simply and forthrightly thought that the city’s actions did in fact fail 
even his deferential approach to rational basis review, or at least that he 
 
114 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).  
115 See Eyer, supra note 80 at 547–53 (noting Justice White’s support for proposed stronger applica-
tions of rational basis review in Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)); but see 
supra note 98 (Powell and Blackmun notes suggesting that Rehnquist was unsure whether the 
city’s actions could survive rational basis scrutiny). 
116 See also Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (noting that at the April 26 conference there appeared 
to be two votes to affirm the Fifth Circuit on rational basis grounds). 
117 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., joined by 
Burger, C.J., concurring).   
118 Of course, it is possible that Justice Rehnquist would not have known how Justices Stevens and 
Burger would eventually vote and write in Cleburne.  Still, he clearly should have known that 
Justice Stevens would likely have questioned the tiered scrutiny enterprise, or at least not signed 
on to it wholeheartedly.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (expressing doubt about that doctrine).  Thus, Justice Rehnquist could have foreseen that 
the combination of adherence to that structure and muscular application of rational basis review 
would have garnered a majority only if he signed on to it. 
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was sufficiently unsure about that question that he was somewhat indiffer-
ent to the result.119  A hint to his thinking comes in the second paragraph of 
his June 5 letter to Justice White.  After reiterating his support for the May 
29 draft’s remand result but expressing a willingness to concede the point 
and have the Court decide the constitutionality of the city’s actions, Justice 
Rehnquist then went on to what seemed to be his real objection to Powell’s 
suggestion.  The second (and final) paragraph of his letter is quoted fully 
here: 
Lewis [Powell] in his letter also suggests that in this event [i.e., that the Court 
decides the case on rational-basis grounds] it would be “unnecessary to consid-
er the quasi-suspect class question.”  I would hope that you would not sub-
scribe to this idea, because it would result in the case deciding absolutely noth-
ing that was not already well known before we took it.  The issue presented by 
the case was whether or not “heightened scrutiny” should be employed to re-
view equal protection claims where made by the mentally retarded: the Court of 
Appeals held that it should be, and we granted certiorari, I thought, to decide 
that question.  To simply “punt” and turn this case into one of five or six hun-
dred decisions of this Court applying rational basis equal protection analysis to 
a particular ordinance would, to my mind, rob the decision of any importance 
which it would otherwise have.120 
Clearly, it mattered to Justice Rehnquist that the Court decide the sus-
pect class question.  Avoiding that issue would, in his view, “result in the 
Court deciding absolutely nothing that was not already well known.”121  
The Court “granted certiorari, [he] thought, to decide that question.”122  
(Circumstantial support for that last assertion comes from Justice Powell’s 
conference notes, which identify Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor and Burg-
er, as voting to grant certiorari, with White and Blackmun each “joining 
three” to provide the necessary numbers for a grant.123  Rehnquist and 
O’Connor were, along with White, perhaps the Justices most insistent on 
deciding the suspect class question.)124  Finally, it is striking, in light of his 
campaign against more stringent rational basis scrutiny, that he minimized 
the significance of a rational basis decision: as he dismissively stated, “[t]o 
 
119 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
120 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985). 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123 See Powell Papers, supra note 47. 
124 The Court’s grant of certiorari was not accompanied by specific questions the Court wished to 
see briefed.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1984).  However, the 
city’s certiorari petition presented two questions, both of which related to the suspect class status 
of intellectual disability.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84-
468), 1984 U.S. Supreme Court Briefs LEXIS 506, 506 (“Questions Presented: 1. Whether men-
tally retarded persons are a ‘quasi-suspect’ class for purposes of Equal Protection analysis. 2. 
Whether for Equal Protection analysis, all legislation affecting mentally retarded persons must be 
tested by an ‘intermediate’ or ‘heightened’ level of scrutiny.”). 
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simply ‘punt’ and turn this case into one of five or six hundred decisions of 
this Court applying rational basis equal protection analysis to a particular 
ordinance would, to [his] mind, rob the decision of any importance which it 
would otherwise have.”125 
Justice Rehnquist’s insistence on deciding the level of scrutiny issue, 
when combined with his seemingly casual willingness to accede to Justice 
Powell’s suggestion that the Court itself apply rational basis scrutiny rather 
than remand that issue to the Court of Appeals, likely provided the impetus 
for what turned out to be the Court’s seemingly odd, “two for the price of 
one”126 approach to the case.  Justice White himself quickly echoed Justice 
Rehnquist’s relative preferences.127  Responding to Justice Powell the next 
day (June 6), White insisted on the appropriateness of the Court deciding 
the suspect class question.128  He used strong language similar to 
Rehnquist’s,129 even suggesting a reassignment of the opinion if a majority 
felt differently.130  By contrast, after repeating his preference for remanding 
the case for the lower court to apply the rational basis standard, he con-
cluded by saying that he “could perhaps accommodate [himself]” to decid-
ing the validity issue.  Even more strikingly, he continued that, should the 
Court wish to reach that issue, he could also accommodate himself “to ei-
ther result that the majority might reach on that question.”131 
To be sure, it might not be that surprising that Justice White was “ac-
commodating” on the question of the ultimate result.  The Justices’ internal 
deliberations in other cases—most notably in Massachusetts Bd of Retire-
ment v. Murgia from nine years earlier—reflected that White was at least 
somewhat sympathetic to the more muscular, Powell/Brennan approach to 
rationality review.132  Thus, unlike Justice Rehnquist’s seeming willingness 
 
125  Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985). 
126 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
127 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985).  Justice 
O’Connor also quickly signaled her agreement with Justice Rehnquist’s approach, in a brief note 
to Justice White, copied to Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dated June 6.  See Powell Papers, su-
pra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June 6, 1985),. 
128 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985). 
129 Id.  (“I see no persuasive reason for not announcing that rationality is the governing standard.  
This is the issue we took this case to decide, there is a clear majority for that standard, and not 
saying so will leave in place an erroneous Fifth Circuit precedent that will govern the District 
Courts in that Circuit.  I doubt that we would have granted this case had it involved only whether 
the rational basis standard had been properly applied; yet confining our decision to the rationality 
of the zoning law indicates a contrary result.”). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).  See Eyer, supra note 80, 
at 547–53 (noting Justice White’s support for proposed stronger applications of rational basis re-
view in Murgia). 
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to accept a rational basis strike-down of the Cleburne ordinance, Justice 
White’s willingness is at least somewhat consistent with his past positions.  
But just like Justice Rehnquist, Justice White was also primarily concerned 
with settling the standard of review question—recall that it was on answer-
ing that question that he insisted on his way, at the cost of his giving up the 
authorship of the opinion. 
Perhaps this priority should not be surprising.  After all, in Cleburne the 
Court was dealing with a circuit court decision explicitly conferring height-
ened scrutiny on a particular class.  That decision had direct and immediate 
applications, at least within the circuit itself.133  Justices, such as Rehnquist, 
who may otherwise have cared more about stopping implicit moves toward 
more muscular rationality review may have been even more concerned 
about stopping lower courts from expanding the set of classifications re-
ceiving explicitly heightened scrutiny.  The same might have been even 
truer for Justices, such as White, who were more sympathetic to such mus-
cular rationality review. 
In other words, compromising with Justice Powell on whether the Court 
should perform the rational basis analysis itself—and even on the result of 
that analysis—might have been perceived as an acceptable price for ensur-
ing a majority for rejecting the appellate court’s suspect class analysis.  Af-
ter all, with three Justices planning on endorsing the lower court’s analysis, 
and Justice Stevens coy on the question,134 there was no margin for error if 
the remaining Justices wished to use Cleburne as a vehicle to discourage 
lower courts from expanding the universe of suspect and quasi-suspect 
classifications.135  Perhaps other of those Justices might have agreed with 
Rehnquist that a rational-basis strike-down of the ordinance would have 
counted as simply, in his words, “one of five or six hundred decisions of 
this Court applying rational basis equal protection analysis to a particular 
ordinance.”136  Certainly, before Justice White circulated his draft rational 
basis analysis on June 11, the risk of Cleburne becoming an important ra-
tional basis precedent seemed, at most, highly speculative.  Given that fact, 
 
133 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985). 
134 See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (noting that Stevens 
might be willing to join Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun). 
135 It bears repeating that Burger, Rehnquist and O’Connor—three of the justices most skeptical of 
expanding the list of suspect classifications—were the three to vote to grant certiorari in 
Cleburne, with White and Blackmun “joining three” and thus granting the petition.  See Powell 
Papers, supra note 47. 
136 Cf.  Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985), (predict-
ing that Cleburne’s suspect class “will be the precedent that counts”). 
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it is perhaps not surprising that, for the major players involved, the suspect 
class issue loomed larger than the rational basis issue.137 
B. A Facial Or As-Applied Strike-Down? 
1. The Progress Toward The As-Applied Approach 
For many scholars, the defining feature of Cleburne’s unusually muscu-
lar rational basis analysis is its insistence on record evidence supporting the 
rationality of the statute’s classification.138  As conceived in its most defer-
ential form, rational basis review does not demand such actual evidentiary 
support.  Instead, as expressed in a foundational statement of such deferen-
tial review coming at the very start of the post-Lochner era, “the existence 
of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed,” and laws 
reviewed under this standard are “not to be pronounced unconstitutional 
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of 
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some ra-
tional basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”139  In 
later years, and extending into the Warren Court, that foundational state-
ment blossomed into canonical equal protection rational basis cases in 
which the Court indulged in extravagant speculation about the possible 
support for challenged legislation that seemed to fit poorly with its asserted 
justifications.140  Cleburne, by faulting the city’s justifications for lacking 
 
137 To be sure, this explanation encounters the difficulty that, after Justice White circulated the 
fourth draft of the opinion, and the first to feature his rational basis analysis, Justice Rehnquist 
nevertheless immediately joined.  See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to 
White, J. (June 12, 1985).  Thus, when confronted with what became Cleburne’s unusually strin-
gent rationality review, Justice Rehnquist still demurred (as did Justice O’Connor, who on June 
12 sent Justice White a note reading simply “Dear Byron, I am still with you on this.”).  Powell 
Papers, supra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June 12, 1985). 
138 See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 2, at 613, 621. 
139 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).  To be sure, in Carolene 
Products, Justice Stone explicitly referred to “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commer-
cial transactions” as the type of legislation subject to this deferential judicial review.  Id.  Never-
theless, as the Court’s tiered scrutiny structure rigidified, this type of extremely deferential re-
view was held to apply to equal protection challenges to laws of any type except those that drew 
suspect (or, later, quasi-suspect) classifications or those that implicated fundamental rights.  See, 
e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (describing a statute to which the Court 
applied such deferential review as “involv[ing] the most basic human needs of impoverished 
human beings”). 
140 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (speculating that a 
law that banned advertising on some trucks but not others, based on the ownership of the truck, 
furthered the city’s asserted interest in traffic safety); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 
(1961) (“A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be 
conceived to justify it.”) (citations omitted).  See also Maltz, supra note 6, at 265 (citing 
McGowan as an example of the Warren Court’s embrace of highly deferential rational basis re-
view). 
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support in the record,141 deviated from this rule.  As noted earlier, scholars 
have cited this deviation as one of the defining characteristics of both this 
case and the more muscular rational basis review that became associated 
with it.142 
The previous section suggested how this aspect of Cleburne—and, in-
deed, its rational basis analysis more generally—did not attract unusual at-
tention from the Justices, other than on the basic question whether the 
Court would perform that analysis at all or simply remand the case for the 
lower court to perform it.143  But the Justices’ papers suggest that the rec-
ord-evidence requirement might itself have been the unintended by-product 
of their resolution of another conflict: between striking down the Cleburne 
ordinance as applied to the plaintiffs’ particular group home, as opposed to 
on its face. 
The as-applied/facial issue arose early in the Justices’ deliberations.  
Justice Powell’s post-oral argument notes indicate that he believed that the 
Cleburne ordinance failed rational basis review “on its face.”144  Moreover, 
on May 29, during the early discussion of whether the Court should remand 
the case for application of rational basis scrutiny, Justice Powell’s clerk, 
arguing against remand, raised the as-applied/facial issue, urging that the 
facial validity of the ordinance was properly before the Court for deci-
sion.145  Justice Powell’s handwritten notes on that memo state that the 
clerk “makes a persuasive argument for holding the ordinance invalid on its 
face.”146 
Nevertheless, it was only after Justice White acquiesced to Justice Pow-
ell’s wish that the Court itself apply rational basis review that the as-
applied/facial issue fully manifested.  On June 5, Powell wrote White, ar-
guing that resolving the standard of review question in favor of rational ba-
sis still left open questions about the ordinance’s facial and as-applied va-
lidity.147  He argued (apparently for a second time, given his post-oral 
argument conference notes148) in favor of a facial strike down.  Because the 
 
141 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 (1984); see also id. at 
455 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to the record as well). 
142 See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 2, at 613, 621. 
143 Most notably, Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor reconfirmed their joins of Justice White’s opin-
ion one day after he circulated the first full draft opinion including his rational basis analysis, 
without any comment.  See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. 
(June 12, 1985); Id. Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 12, 1985).  But see infra note 
170 (noting one small change Justice Rehnquist requested in that analysis when it was circulated 
to the Court before being incorporated into a complete draft opinion). 
144 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985). 
145 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie to Powell, J. (May 29, 1985). 
146 Id. 
147 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985). 
148 See Powell Papers, supra note 47 (notes of the March 20 conference). 
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discussion became somewhat confused, it might help to specify what Jus-
tice Powell meant by a facial strike-down.  Justice Powell argued that the 
ordinance’s lumping together of the intellectually disabled with other 
groups, such as insane persons and drug addicts, lacked any rational basis 
on its face—that is, without any reference to the particulars of a given 
group home for intellectually disabled persons.149 
Justice White responded the next day, in a letter to Justice Powell on 
which he copied the conference, disagreeing with that approach.150  He not-
ed the Court’s general preference for performing as-applied review before 
considering a facial strike-down.  Turning to the Cleburne ordinance, he 
cited the wide variance in intellectual disability, and concluded that he 
“f[ound] it difficult to believe that the special permit requirement would be 
invalid with respect to each and every group of the mentally retarded.”151  
He concluded that “[i]t may be that in light of the characteristics of the 
group involved in this case and in light of the city’s proffered justifications, 
the special permit cannot constitutionally be denied.  But this would not be 
a facial invalidity holding.”152 
The same day Justice White circulated his letter to Justice Powell to the 
conference, Justice O’Connor stepped in to offer her support to Justice 
White.  In a note to White, copies of which she circulated only to Powell 
and Rehnquist, O’Connor wrote that she “will still be with [White] if 
[White] decide[d] the statute is facially invalid, as Lewis [Powell] sug-
gest[ed].”153  However, again reflecting the priorities shared by her and Jus-
tice Rehnquist, she continued: “[B]ut I also agree with Bill Rehnquist that 
we should decide the quasi-suspect class issue in any event.”154 
Justice O’Connor’s note made clear that White had support regardless 
of what he did on the as-applied/facial issue, as long as he held firm on the 
Court deciding the suspect class question.  At this point, we can begin to 
see the outlines of Cleburne’s various oddities.  Consider first the eventual 
opinion’s decision both to decide the suspect class question and strike 
down the city’s action on rational basis grounds—the “two for the price of 
one” decision-making Justice Marshall criticized in his dissent.  The indi-
vidual Justices’ preferences suggest that Justice White may have had no re-
al choice but to decide both issues.  With three dissenters planning on argu-
ing that the intellectually disabled constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class, and with Justice Stevens having expressed ambivalence about the 
 
149 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985). 
150 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985). 
151  Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June 6, 1985). 
154 Id. 
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need to perform suspect class analysis, Justice White had no further votes 
to lose on the suspect class question.155  With Justice Powell now insisting 
that the Court should itself use rational basis scrutiny to decide the case, 
and with White’s allies (Rehnquist and O’Connor) acquiescing in such an 
approach as long as the Court committed itself to deciding the suspect class 
issue, we can see how perhaps Justice White, despite his continued prefer-
ence for remanding the case to the lower court for application of rational 
basis review,156 might have decided to give in to Powell as the price of 
keeping his majority on the suspect class issue.  But when Powell notified 
White on June 7 that he had come around to accepting the appropriateness 
of deciding the suspect class question,157 there was no longer any need to 
press him on that question.  Instead, for Justice White the path of least re-
sistance lay through addressing both the suspect class and rational basis is-
sues. 
But the facial/as-applied issue remained unresolved.  Justice 
O’Connor’s letter suggested that she and, by implication, Justice Rehnquist 
remained relatively unconcerned about that issue.  But Justice White re-
mained firm on this question: in contrast to his accommodating attitude on 
the remand question, he insisted that any application of rational basis re-
view result, at most, in a strike-down of the city’s actions as applied to its 
conduct in this particular case. 
Now it was Justice Powell’s turn to bend.  Perhaps convinced by his 
law clerk, who wrote a memo to him on June 6 suggesting that an as-
applied strike-down was also appropriate,158 Justice Powell wrote to Justice 
White the next day, June 7, expressing a willingness to “join four to make a 
Court” striking down the city’s action on an as-applied basis.159 
This might have resolved the question, and cemented the Court’s ulti-
mate approaches to both the remand and the facial/as-applied issues.  But 
one last flurry, from a perhaps unexpected source, provided a final bit of 
drama.  June 7, 1985, was a Friday.160  The following Monday, June 10, 
 
155 Justice Stevens eventually joined Justice White’s opinion for the Court, even though his own 
concurrence—especially its critique of suspect class analysis—stands in considerable tension 
with much of the opinion he joined. 
156 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985) (noting that he 
“much prefer[red]” remanding to the lower court to apply rational basis scrutiny). 
157 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7, 1985) (“In my let-
ter of June 5 [to White, the recipient of the June 7 letter], I expressed the view that if we held the 
ordinance facially invalid it would be unnecessary to consider the quasi-suspect class question.  
There is a good deal to your point, however, that the question is here and needs resolving.  I 
would be willing to join an opinion holding that only the rational basis standard is applicable.”). 
158 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 6, 
1985). 
159 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7, 1985). 
160 See Calendar for Year 1985 (United States), TIMEANDDATE.COM, http://www.timeanddate.com/ 
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Justice Brennan wrote Justice Powell, copying the conference.  That brief 
note stated that Brennan had reviewed Powell’s correspondence with 
White, and observed that, given Powell’s preference for a facial strike-
down of the statute, there appeared to be a majority for that proposition, 
“although perhaps on varying grounds.”161  (Those varying grounds, of 
course, would have been the differing standards that embryonic coalition 
might have deemed appropriate for reviewing the ordinance: rational basis 
for Powell, and perhaps Stevens, and heightened scrutiny for Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun.162) 
It was now Justice Powell’s turn to defend his prior commitments.  Re-
sponding that same day, he wrote Brennan that he had already committed 
to “consider[ing]” an opinion striking down the action on as-applied ba-
sis.163  Powell may have felt obliged to say that, and thus reject Brennan’s 
proposed new coalition, because that same day (June 10), White had writ-
ten Powell stating that he was going to “make a try” at an opinion invali-
dating the law on an as-applied basis, and reminding him of Powell’s open-
ness to joining four on such an opinion, which he (Powell) had expressed 
the previous Friday.164  Tantalizingly, Justice White’s June 10 note referred 
to a “conversation” he and Powell had had earlier that day.  It is quite pos-
sible, then, that Justice Brennan’s note of that same date, offering a majori-
ty for a facial strike-down, triggered Justice White to reach out to Powell 
either by phone or in person, perhaps to remind him of his June 7 commit-
ment to joining four for an as-applied strike down. 
As noted above, Justice Powell responded to Justice Brennan that same 
day, reminding Brennan of the commitment he (Powell) had made to 
 
  calendar/?year=1985&country=1 (last visited Jan. 3., 2017). 
161 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Brennan, J. to Powell, J. (June 10, 1985); see also 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52. 
162 On this point it is worth noting that Justice Powell’s clerk had earlier in the process (May 29) 
suggested to Powell that, if Powell agreed to it, Justice Marshall’s draft dissent might become the 
majority, given that Justices Brennan and Blackmun were known to agree with Marshall, and that 
Justice Stevens was planning on announcing his willingness to join an opinion striking down the 
ordinance on its face.  See Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J., supra note 135, at 
2 n.1.  Moreover, the clerk informed Justice Powell that Marshall’s opinion was likely to be writ-
ten in a way that would allow a Justice to join any one (or more) of several different rationales 
for striking the law down.  Id. at 2.  Perhaps Brennan had that structure in mind when he suggest-
ed that Powell might be able easily to join the part of that anticipated opinion that struck down 
the law on its face for failing rational basis scrutiny, without having to join the part arguing for 
and applying heightened scrutiny.  Indeed, Marshall did not circulate a draft of his dissent until 
June 24, two weeks after Brennan’s overture to Powell. 
163 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985); Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 52. 
164 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 10, 1985); see also 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52. 
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White.165  But, interestingly, he also noted that he had come to believe that 
the opinion should in fact establish rational basis as the appropriate stand-
ard—a real evolution from his earlier thinking where he had wondered 
whether a rational-basis strike-down by the Court would render the suspect 
class analysis “unnecessary.”166  Indeed, in a final statement of the evolu-
tion of his thinking, he concluded his rejection of Brennan’s overture by 
stating that “[t]his [the suspect class analysis] will be the precedent that 
counts.”167 
2. The As-Applied Analysis 
Perhaps motivated by Justice Brennan’s lobbying of Powell, or perhaps 
simply spurred on by the looming end of the term, Justice White acted 
quickly to draft the rational basis analysis striking down the city’s action.  
He appears to have circulated a partial revised draft, focusing on that analy-
sis, on June 10, although records of this draft do not appear in the papers 
examined.168  A full draft was circulated the next day.169  With the im-
portant exception of the as-applied versus facial nature of the Court’s final 
decision, the analysis in his June 11 draft largely took the form that would 
eventually appear in the final opinion for the Court.  Most notably, it began 
by noting the neighborhood opposition to the group home, and rejecting 
that opposition (to the extent it was motivated by fear or dislike of the 
would-be residents) as a legitimate interest that might justify the permit de-
nial.170 
 
165 That commitment was made in a June 7 letter from Powell to White, on which Powell copied the 
conference.  See  See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7, 
1985).  Thus, Brennan would have been aware of that commitment. 
166 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985). 
167 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985). 
168 See Papers of J. Byron White (on file with the Library of Congress, Box II:28, Folder 1) [herein-
after White Papers], Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 11, 1985), (referring to “the par-
tial draft which you sent down yesterday,” and continuing “I assume that the part of the opinion 
presently circulating which holds that ‘heightened scrutiny’ is not required will remain as is.”). 
169 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Third Draft (June 11, 1985) [hereinafter June 11 Draft]; see 
also Blackmun Papers, supra note 52; White Papers, supra note 168. 
170 June 11 Draft, supra note 169.  One change on this point was prompted by Justice Rehnquist.  
After beginning its analysis with the following statement, “[f]irst, the Council was concerned 
with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located within 200 feet of the 
Featherston facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood,” the thus-
far unrecovered June 10 draft apparently moved directly and unambiguously to condemn such at-
titudes and fears.  In his June 11 letter, Justice Rehnquist requested a softening of that condemna-
tion.  He wrote: 
I agree with you that just “negative attitude” or “fear” of neighbors, without any substan-
tiation of reasons for it, may not properly be considered by a zoning commission.  But I 
would like to at least reserve the question of whether “negative attitude” or “fear” that 
has some sort of reasonable basis -- fear of decline in property value, and the like, may 
not be considered as a factor. 
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Continuing to follow the template that would appear in the final opin-
ion, Justice White then considered the more legitimate justifications for the 
city’s actions—flood evacuation, population density, and the like.  In re-
jecting those justifications, his draft opinion expressed skepticism about the 
existence of relevant differences differentiating the group home from other 
land uses, such as sanitariums and old age homes, which did not require a 
permit.171  The Court’s skepticism is notable, of course, given its tension 
with conventional rational basis review, which indulges every presumption 
favoring the government.172  Indeed, it was in this draft that Justice White’s 
famous reference to the lack of record evidence appears—a reference that 
reinforces the unusual skepticism of the Court’s analysis.173 
For our purposes, the interesting point here is the connection between 
this unusually stringent review and the as-applied character of the draft’s 
analysis.  Justice White began his rational basis review by squarely identi-
fying its as-applied nature.  He even took the time to justify that decision, 
explaining (perhaps as a final argument to Justice Powell or perhaps simply 
as reflecting his views on the issue) that as-applied review was favored 
over facial review in constitutional cases, as it allows the Court to avoid 
making “unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments.”174 
But ambiguities immediately crept in to his description of the Court’s 
analysis as as-applied.  He noted the zoning ordinance’s lack of a permit 
requirement for many multi-resident land uses, but then observed that the 
ordinance did require such a permit for the Featherston home, “because it 
would be a facility for the mentally retarded.”175  He then posed the ques-
tion he set out to answer: “May the city deny the permit to this facility 
when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are freely permitted?”176 
 
  White Papers, supra note 168, Letter from Rehnquist, J., to White, J. (June 11, 1985).  He there-
fore requested the insertion of a new sentence immediately after the one quoted above, “to this 
effect,” then offering the following sentence: 
“But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cog-
nizable in a zoning proceeding, is not a permissible basis for treating a home for the men-
tally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.” 
  Id.  Justice White incorporated this suggestion verbatim in the June 11 draft.  See June 11 Draft, 
supra note 169.  It appears in the final version of the opinion.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984). 
171  June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 13–14. 
172 See supra notes 139–140 (noting instances of deferential review that were resolved in the gov-
ernment’s favor). 
173 See June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 16 (pointing out that the record fails to clarify why “the 
characteristics of the intended occupants . . . justifies denying to those occupants what would be 
permitted to [other] groups”). 
174 Id. at 13. 
175  Id. at 14. 
176 Id. 
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Justice White’s framing of the question reflects the ambiguity of the as-
applied/facial distinction, at least as that distinction applied in this case.  
On the one hand, he squarely stated that the review was as-applied.  In ad-
dition, this draft focused on the permit denial (a particularized decision) ra-
ther than the underlying (general) requirement that any group home for the 
intellectually disabled obtain a permit.  Yet, quoting the trial court, he 
framed the city’s action as resting on the fact that the would-be residents 
were intellectually disabled, without any reference to the particular charac-
teristics of the individuals who sought to live in the Featherston home.  In 
other words, it was possible to see the city’s action, as Justice White 
framed it, as presenting a facial challenge to the inclusion of intellectual 
disability within the list of characteristics that would trigger the permit re-
quirement—as a general matter, without reference to the qualities of the 
would-be occupants of the Featherston home, such as their location on the 
intellectual disability spectrum. 
This ambiguity was reflected in the analysis that followed in his draft.  
While Justice White led off by citing the neighborhood opposition to the 
particular facility at issue (the Featherston home), he then moved on to oth-
er objections (flood evacuation and the like), which the Court rejected in 
general terms, rather than as applied to the would-be Featherston residents.  
Justice Powell’s clerk—who, like her boss, had pushed for a facial invalidi-
ty ruling throughout the Justices’ deliberations—identified this ambigui-
ty.177  She also raised the issue whether White’s draft addressed only the 
permit denial, rather than the underlying requirement that the home obtain 
a permit.  In her view, because the plaintiffs challenged both decisions (that 
a permit was required, and denying that permit), a decision striking down 
only the denial did not fully dispose of the case.178 
Justice Powell raised this latter point with Justice White in a letter dated 
June 15.179  He stated that he believed that “modest changes” would make 
clear that the (particular) denial and the (general) underlying permit re-
quirement both violated equal protection.  Justice White, in a draft dated 
June 17, made those changes, substituting references to the permit denial 
with references to the permit requirement itself.180  In a letter of that same 
 
177 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie to Justice Powell (June 13 
1985). 
178 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie to Justice Powell (June 14, 
1985). 
179 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 15, 1985); see also 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 15, 1985). 
180 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Fourth Draft (June 17, 1985) [hereinafter June 17 Draft]; 
White Papers, supra note 168.  The matter, however, is not simple as this.  The relevant changes 
Justice White made to the June 11 draft simply replaced references to the city’s permit denial 
with references to its requirement that the home obtain a permit.  Compare June 11 Draft, supra 
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date, however, he cautioned Powell that, “[i]f these changes do not satisfy 
you, it seems to me that you are insisting on deciding the facial validity is-
sue, which I thought you had agreed could be put aside.”181 
In the next paragraph of that letter, Justice White set forth his concern 
with a broader ruling.  Such a ruling, he explained (again),182 could call into 
question the city’s ability to insist on a permit in a case of more profoundly 
intellectually disabled persons seeking to live together in a group setting.183  
He expressed concern that a facial strike-down of the Cleburne ordinance 
would make such regulation impossible.184  At this point Justice Powell 
stopped pushing.  That same day, June 17, he joined the opinion.185  Justic-
 
note 169, at 13 (“We inquire first whether denying a special use permit for the Featherston home 
in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the laws.”) with June 17 
Draft, supra at 13 (“We inquire first whether requiring a special use permit for the Featherston 
home in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the laws.”).  
Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 14 (“May the city deny the permit to this facility 
when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are freely permitted?”) with June 17 Draft, supra 
at 14 (“May the city require the permit for this facility when other care and multiple dwelling fa-
cilities are freely permitted?”).  Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 14 (“The District 
Court found that the City Council’s denial of the permit rested on several factors.”) with June 17 
Draft, supra at 14 (“The District Court found that the City Council’s insistence on the permit 
rested on several factors.”).  Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 16 (“The short of it is 
that denial of the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the 
mentally retarded.”) with June 17 Draft, supra at 16 (“The short of it is that requiring the permit 
in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”) (all 
emphases added).  Justice White’s simple—and perhaps artful—substitution of “require” for 
“deny” thus addressed the (general) permit requirement, aiming to satisfy Justice Powell, while 
nevertheless retaining the opinion’s ostensible as-applied focus on the particular action of the 
city in requiring an ordinance for this particular group home.  The problem here is that that re-
quirement, even if White styled it a particularized imposition on the home at 201 Featherston, 
was imposed by the generally-applicable terms of the ordinance.  Thus, it appears as though Jus-
tice White might have been trying to convince Justice Powell that the Court really was deciding 
the constitutionality of the permit requirement, while perhaps preserving the opinion’s as-applied 
focus—even if that preservation came at the cost of misconstruing the generally-applicable na-
ture of the ordinance’s permit requirement. 
181 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 17, 1985).  Indeed, de-
spite the changes Justice White made to accommodate Justice Powell’s June 15 request, see su-
pra note 180, he retained the language disclaiming facial review of the ordinance and defending 
his prioritization of as-applied review.  Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 13 with June 
17 Draft, supra note 180, at 13. 
182 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985) (raising the 
concern that the classification “mentally retarded” is so broad that a decision addressing that 
group as a whole could invalidate otherwise lawful permits). 
183 See id. (expressing the same concern); supra note 181 (citing a letter explaining Justice White’s 
concern with a broad ruling). 
184 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985) (expressing 
the same concern); supra note 181. 
185 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 17, 1985). 
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es Stevens followed shortly, with Chief Justice Burger soon thereafter join-
ing Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion.186 
III.  WAS CLEBURNE AN ACCIDENT? 
Part II recounted the sequence of the Justices’ deliberations in 
Cleburne, from the certiorari vote to Justice Powell’s decision to accept the 
as-applied nature of Justice White’s analysis and join White’s opinion.  
Part III reconsiders those deliberations, to examine what they suggest about 
the decisional process in that case.  This reconsideration will set the stage 
for more general reflections about the Court, and the impact of its decision-
al processes on legal doctrine, in Part IV. 
A. The Decision Not To Remand 
The Court’s decision not to remand, but rather to decide the rational ba-
sis issue itself, constitutes the threshold puzzle in Cleburne.  As noted in 
Part I, Justice Marshall began his dissent by critiquing the Court’s perfor-
mance of suspect class analysis, in light of its ultimate decision that the law 
failed rational basis scrutiny.  As Part II indicated, Justice Powell harbored 
the same concern, although he eventually overcame his qualms and, indeed, 
predicted that the suspect class analysis “will be the precedent that 
counts.”187 
The evidence identified in Part II suggests that the need to build a ma-
jority coalition might have lay behind Justice White’s decision to address 
both issues.  Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor appeared relatively indiffer-
ent to the prospect of the Court itself applying the rational basis standard, 
as long as it also reached (and rejected) the lower court’s suspect class 
analysis.188  Given the different weights to those preferences, Justice 
White—who shared Rehnquist’s and O’Connor’s inclination to remand the 
 
186 Justice Stevens joined it on June 19.  See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Stevens, J. to 
White, J. (June 19, 1985).  Oddly, Chief Justice Burger appears never to have joined Justice 
White’s majority, although he is customarily described as having done so.  See supra note 47 
(summarizing correspondence from Annmarie, not noting Chief Justice Burger’s decision to join 
Justice White’s opinion).  It may be that Burger’s join of Stevens’ opinion, which explicitly not-
ed that Stevens “join[ed]” White’s opinion, constituted Burger’s own join.  Id. 
187 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985). 
188 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist’s relatively mild reaction to Justice White’s rational basis analysis—
requesting nothing more than a mild caveat to the (possibly-lost) June 10 draft’s statement about 
the inadmissibility of neighbors’ “negative attitudes” and “fear,” (see supra note 170)—suggests 
that he was also not particularly concerned about the substance of that analysis.  The papers ex-
amined lack any other reference to any objection to that analysis by either Rehnquist or 
O’Connor (or anyone else on the Court). 
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case—was free to accede to Justice Powell’s insistence and decide the is-
sue. 
Of course, it is ironic that Justice Rehnquist appeared to have given Jus-
tice White the green light to cater to Justice Powell and apply the rational 
basis scrutiny the Court called for.  As Part II explained, Justice Rehnquist 
cared very much about limiting judicial review under the rational basis 
standard.  That preference was strong enough to lead him to characterize 
the Court’s analysis in cases such as Craig as instituting a new, explicitly 
intermediate, level of scrutiny, if that move helped immunize rational basis 
scrutiny from the prospect of more intrusive judicial review.189 
Yet Cleburne appears to have raised for Justice Rehnquist an even more 
serious threat: the prospect of continued expansion of suspect and quasi-
suspect classifications.  While he might have been willing to characterize 
an otherwise-unclear majority opinion in Craig190 as instituting a new, “in-
termediate,” scrutiny level in exchange for cabining more muscular rational 
basis review when the Court’s analysis itself was at issue,191 the situation 
might have looked very different to him when what was at stake was a low-
er court’s decision explicitly enshrining such heightened review.  Such a 
decision, if left undisturbed by the Court, might well expand, both to other 
courts and to other groups. 
On this point it is useful to recall two facts.  First, Justice White, chan-
neling Justice Rehnquist’s concern about the Fifth Circuit’s bestowal of 
heightened scrutiny, noted in his June 6 letter to Justice Powell the fact that 
the appellate court’s suspect class decision, if not rejected, would govern 
district court cases from that circuit.192  Second, the lower courts in 
Cleburne concluded that federal courts had disagreed on the question of the 
scrutiny status required for intellectual disability.193  Combined, these ob-
servations focus our attention on what might have concerned Justice 
Rehnquist and his like-minded colleagues: the possibility that failure to ad-
dress the suspect class issue would, in White’s words, “leave in place an 
 
189 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text (noting 
Rehnquist’s insistence that the rational basis test remain deferential and the consequences of that 
position).  This move cannot be explained by suggesting that Rehnquist in fact agreed with the 
idea of heightened scrutiny for sex classifications.  See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 
U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J.) (refusing to acknowledge that previous 
cases, including Craig itself, had instituted tougher-than-normal scrutiny of sex classifications, 
and focusing instead on the Court’s rejection of strict scrutiny in Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677). 
190 The Court in Craig did not explicitly state that it was instituting an intermediate scrutiny level. 
191 See Eyer, supra note 80. 
192 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985). 
193 See Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 196 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984) (listing 
cases in which federal courts had come to varied opinions on the level of scrutiny question); 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, No. CA3-80-1576-F, slip op. at 18–19 (N.D. Tex., 
Dallas Div. 1982) (same). 
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erroneous Fifth Circuit precedent”194 that, if left undisturbed by the Court, 
might also tip the balance in other lower courts considering the same issue. 
When combined with the Court’s liberals’ continued call for expanding 
the list of suspect classes,195 one might understand how the more conserva-
tive Justices understood the relative stakes of the two questions posed in 
Cleburne.  In contrast to his focus on the suspect class issue, Rehnquist’s 
dismissive description of Cleburne’s character as a rational basis deci-
sion—“one of five or six hundred decisions of this Court applying rational 
basis equal protection analysis to a particular ordinance”—suggests his lack 
of concern about that part of the opinion.196  The irony of that dismissive-
ness will not be lost on anyone who knows the important role that aspect of 
the opinion has played in the evolution of the Court’s subsequent equal 
protection doctrine.197 
Of course, identifying Justice Rehnquist’s motives involves, at best, in-
formed speculation.  Without indulging further in such speculation, what 
Cleburne suggests is that when a case presents multiple issues, a Justice’s 
decision to focus on one issue (such as Rehnquist’s focus on the suspect 
class question) may influence those other results in ways that are quite un-
intended.  Moving beyond the role played by Justice Rehnquist, this dy-
namic highlights the imperatives of institutional dynamics—the need to 
count to five, in Justice Brennan’s well-known phrasing.198  In Cleburne, 
Justice Rehnquist’s willingness to indulge Justice Powell’s insistence that 
the Court decide the case rather than remanding—a willingness that ap-
pears, at least inferentially, to have been driven by his desire to cement a 
majority for the Court’s suspect class analysis—paved the road to the 
 
194 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985). 
195 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissent from the 
denial of certiorari in Rowland, 470 U.S. 1009 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari)).  Recall also that in the post-oral argument conferences Justice 
Blackmun joined Justices Brennan and Marshall in committing to supporting heightened scrutiny 
for the intellectually disabled, and Justice Stevens left open that possibility.  See Powell Papers, 
supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (appearing to make the notation, “apply 
heightened standard” under Justice Blackmun’s name); Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter 
from Stevens, J., to White, J. (June 3, 1985) (agreeing that the court of appeals did not need to 
apply a “somewhat heightened” standard of scrutiny but expressing willingness to move forward 
to the conclusion that the discrimination at issue was unconstitutional). 
196  Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice White (June 5, 1985), in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Li-
brary of Congress, box 371, file 11. 
197 Cf. supra note 136 (highlighting Powell’s statement that Cleburne’s suspect class analysis “will 
be the precedent that counts”). 
198 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam, William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 32 
(1997) (“Justice Brennan used to joke that a critical talent for a Supreme Court Justice was the 
ability to count to five.”).  See generally William D. Araiza, Playing Well with Others—But Still 
Winning: Chief Justice Roberts, Precedent, and the Possibilities of a Multi-Member Court, 46 
GA. L. REV. 1059 (2012) (explaining how institutional dynamics can impact the path of constitu-
tional doctrine). 
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Court’s rational basis analysis.  It also led to the oddity—criticized by Jus-
tice Marshall—of the Court’s “two for the price of one” sequencing of the 
issues in that case.  Thus, the Court’s multi-member dynamic appears to 
have led to results that were subject to objective critique (the Court’s se-
quencing decision), unintended by some critical, seemingly victorious, 
players in that dynamic (the creation of heightened rational basis review), 
and, indeed, probably unintended by a majority of the Court.199 
B. As-Applied Review/Heightened Rationality Review 
Beyond the decision to reach the rational basis issue, the substance of 
the Court’s rational basis analysis appears to have been the unintended re-
sult of a dispute among the Justices on yet another seemingly distinct issue.  
As Part II.B. set forth, once Justice White agreed to expand his opinion by 
resolving the case rather than remanding it, he and Justice Powell engaged 
in an extended discussion over whether that resolution appropriately en-
tailed a facial strike-down of the Cleburne ordinance or a strike-down as 
applied only to the particular group home and its would-be residents.  But 
unlike their discussion of the remand issue, this dialogue ended with Justice 
White successfully holding his position in favor of an as-applied, rather 
than a facial, strike-down. 
Beyond generally accepting the majority position that facial strike-
downs were disfavored in comparison to more limited as-applied deci-
sions,200 in June 1985 Justice White was deeply invested in the outcome of 
the as-applied/facial question.  Pending during his discussions with Justice 
Powell was his draft for the Court in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,201 a First 
Amendment case where Justice White, writing for the majority, insisted 
that as-applied strike-downs were favored over facial invalidations. 
Spokane Arcades’s subject-matter—the First Amendment—matters to 
the facial/as-applied distinction: First Amendment “overbreadth” doctrine 
provides the strongest case for deviating from the preference for as-applied 
strike downs.  First Amendment “overbreadth” analysis contemplates that a 
plaintiff whose expression could be validly regulated may nevertheless ar-
 
199 Recall that both Justices White and Rehnquist expressed a preference for remanding the case, 
and that Justice White, in particular, described that as a course he “much prefer[red].”  Powell 
Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985). 
200 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 740, 745 (1987) (majority opinion, joined by White, 
J.) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully”).  Justice White also wrote an important opinion cautioning against widespread use 
of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–16 
(1973).  Overbreadth doctrine, and its relation to the facial/as-applied issue, is explained in the 
next paragraph in the text. 
201 472 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1985).  Spokane Arcades was handed down on June 19, 1985.  Id. at 491. 
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gue that others’ expression was unconstitutionally infringed by the law that 
ensnared him.  The Court’s willingness to allow such a plaintiff to cite the 
“chill” the law exerted on others’ speech deviates from its normal prefer-
ence for deciding whether a given law is valid as applied to that plaintiff— 
indeed, the Court has gone so far as to ground that preference in the general 
rule that a plaintiff lacks standing to assert the legal rights of third par-
ties.202  Nevertheless, in Spokane Arcades—a First Amendment case—
Justice White insisted that as-applied invalidation of the law at issue was 
the appropriate response, because the plaintiffs themselves were the victims 
of unconstitutional regulation of their expression. 
Thus, Spokane Arcades presented a plausible reason for departing from 
First Amendment overbreadth analysis and striking the law down only in 
part.  Nevertheless, it might still have been seen as odd for Justice White to 
have authored two majority opinions in short order, one of them (Spokane 
Arcades) insisting that as-applied invalidation was the appropriate course 
of action, even in a First Amendment case, and the other (Cleburne) strik-
ing down an ordinance on its face.203 
Regardless of whether his pending opinion in Spokane Arcades was the 
cause, in Cleburne Justice White held fast to the as-applied approach he 
initially proposed.  In turn, that approach logically required that his analysis 
focus on the details of the particular group home that was forced to seek a 
special permit and that was then denied that permit.  Given that more par-
ticularized, factual focus, one can understand why his rational basis analy-
sis explicitly centered on whether record evidence supported the city’s ex-
 
202 See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (“Given a 
case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected [by the First Amendment] 
may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amend-
ment rights of other parties not before the court.  In these First Amendment contexts, the courts 
are inclined to disregard the normal rule against permitting one whose conduct may validly be 
prohibited to challenge the proscription as it applies to others because of the possibility that pro-
tected speech or associative activities may be inhibited by the overly broad reach of the statute.”) 
(citations omitted); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (“[T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of 
standing to permit—in the First Amendment area—‘attacks on overly broad statutes with no re-
quirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regu-
lated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.’”) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 
380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 
YALE L.J. 853, 867 (1991) (“The most common account of the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine justifies a departure from ordinary standing principles in procedural or prophylactic 
terms.”). 
203 Indeed, Justice White’s authorship of Broadrick, a case that came to be influential for insisting 
that overbreadth challenges be strictly limited even given the unique First Amendment-based 
concerns over laws chilling protected speech, suggests the strength of his commitment to a rule 
generally preferring as-applied rather than facial invalidations.  See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610–
16. 
662 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:3 
 
planations for its actions.204  After all, if the proper scope of the analysis 
was limited to the particular facts of the group home Jan Hannah sought to 
establish, one would naturally seek those facts in the record of the litigation 
involving her home. 
In turn, reliance on that record implies, even if it does not mandate, a 
shift in the burden of proof.  Even if it is conceivable that a court in an 
equal protection case could refer to the record but nevertheless maintain a 
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the government, such a reference nev-
ertheless changes the tone of the Court’s analysis.  Quite simply, reference 
to the record seems conceptually, if admittedly not ineluctably, inconsistent 
with a rational basis doctrine205 that allows a court to embrace completely 
speculative, non-record based facts supporting the rationality of the gov-
ernment’s action.206 
These characteristics of Cleburne—the insistence on record evidence 
supporting the city’s action, the resulting conceptual shift in the burden of 
proof, and, more generally, the Court’s more probing tone—all became 
hallmarks of that case’s more searching version of rational basis scrutiny.  
As explained above, it is plausible to believe that the first of these charac-
teristics—the insistence on record evidence—triggered the latter two.  In 
turn, that insistence on record evidence may well have flowed unwittingly 
from Justice White’s insistence on an as-applied analysis. 
Circumstantial evidence for this thesis arises from the flaws in that as-
applied analysis.  As earlier parts of this Article noted, Justice Powell and 
his clerk had long believed that the Cleburne ordinance should be struck 
down on its face.  After examining the first draft of Justice White’s rational 
basis analysis, that clerk remarked that, while she approved of the analysis, 
it struck her as supporting a facial, rather than an as-applied, strike-
down.207  She concluded that White’s analysis said much about intellectual-
 
204 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984) (“Because in our view 
the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose 
any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it 
holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case.”); id. at 450 (“At least this record does not 
clarify how . . . the characteristics of the intended occupants of the Featherston home rationally 
justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the same site 
for different purposes.”); cf. id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (“The ‘record’ is said not to support the ordinance’s classifications but under the 
traditional standard we do not sift through the record to determine whether policy decisions are 
squarely supported by a firm factual foundation.”) (quoting majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
205 See, e.g., supra notes 139–140 (citing cases adopting this highly deferential approach, under 
which laws can satisfy the rational basis standard without reference to the record). 
206 See supra note 204 (quoting Justice Marshall’s similar critique of the majority opinion’s recourse 
to the record). 
207 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 13, 
1985). 
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ly disabled persons in general as occupants of a neighborhood, but nothing 
about the particular would-be residents of the Featherston home.208 
That critique, even as slightly corrected,209 implies either that Justice 
White was more committed to the idea of as-applied review than its full 
application (which would have required a more intensive granular focus on 
the particular residents of the Featherston home), or, alternatively or addi-
tionally, that a case such as Cleburne posed a vexing problem for the as-
applied/facial issue.  The first possibility has already been mentioned in the 
context of his then-pending decision in Spokane Arcades,210 but its resolu-
tion must remain speculative. 
As for the second possibility, the evidence tends to support, tentatively, 
the hypothesis that Cleburne illustrates the complexity of the as-
applied/facial distinction, and the difficulty that distinction poses for judg-
es.211  Consider that evidence.  During the aforementioned White-Powell 
correspondence about Justice White’s rational basis analysis, White insist-
ed that an as-applied analysis was appropriate because the city might be 
justified in requiring a permit for group homes for the intellectually disa-
bled in some circumstances: either when the would-be residents were more 
profoundly disabled, or when such persons proposed to live together with-
out supervision.212  Thus, there was a reason for White’s insistence on an 
as-applied approach, beyond his mere abstract commitment to that ap-
proach (an approach that, to repeat, he was then in the course of defending 
and explaining in his Spokane Arcades draft).  Nevertheless, the granularity 
of his analysis in the letter he sent to Justice Powell defending the as-
applied approach was largely absent in the rational basis analysis he ex-
pressed in the opinion himself.  Justice Powell’s clerk noted this absence—
she remarked that White’s analysis was “quite good,” but “support[ed] 
[Justice Powell’s] position for a ‘facial’ challenge better than it support[ed] 
[Justice White’s] position for an ‘as-applied’ challenge.”213 
 
208 Id.  In fact, the June 11 draft’s rational basis analysis the clerk was reviewing did contain two 
references to the particular characteristics of the intellectually disabled persons who sought to 
occupy the Featherston home.  See June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 15 (referring to the “mildly 
or moderately mentally retarded individuals who would live at 201 Featherston”); id. at 16 (not-
ing that “[t]hose who would live in the Featherston home are the type of individuals 
who . . . satisfy federal [and] state standards for group housing in the community”).  Both of the-
se references survived into the final opinion.  See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449–50. 
209 See supra note 208. 
210 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
211 Cf. Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 13, 
1985), at 2 (describing “a somewhat artificial distinction between facial and as applied challeng-
es” in White’s June 11 draft). 
212 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 17, 1985). 
213 Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 13, 
1985).  Ironically, one point in Justice White’s analysis where he did carefully focus on the dif-
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Evaluating that critique, we should recognize that, had Justice White in 
fact suggested that the city might have been justified in denying more pro-
foundly disabled persons the opportunity to occupy the Featherston home, 
he would have been indulging in the same type of judicial review of tech-
nocratic judgments about the effect of differing degrees of intellectual dis-
ability that he had already criticized earlier in his opinion.  Recall that in 
the prior part of his opinion, dealing with the suspect class issue, he cited 
courts’ inability to draw such fine lines as one of the reasons for rejecting 
heightened scrutiny for the intellectually disabled as a general matter.214  
Had he then suggested, in the next part of his opinion, that courts might en-
dorse the rationality of municipalities’ restrictions on the living arrange-
ments of more profoundly disabled persons, he would essentially have been 
calling on lower courts to make those same technocratic judgments.215 
Scholars have long debated the concepts of facial and as-applied judi-
cial invalidations of statutes.  Some have suggested that the distinction be-
tween the two is less bright than it seems, and may reflect underlying sub-
stantive doctrine rather than a generally-applicable trans-substantive rule 
about the proper scope of judicial strike-downs.216  In this case, there does 
seem to exist a basic doctrinal tension at the core of Justice White’s osten-
sibly as-applied analysis in Cleburne.  It seems likely from the communica-
tions recounted above that Justice White’s concern for allowing Cleburne 
 
ferent levels of intellectual disability was in his suspect class analysis.  See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 
442 (“Nor are [the intellectually disabled] all cut from the same pattern: as the testimony in this 
record indicates, they range from those whose disability is not immediately evident to those who 
must be constantly cared for.”); id. (referring to the intellectually disabled as a “large and diversi-
fied group”) (emphasis added).  As noted in the next paragraph of the text, this reference may 
have been telling: his anxiety about courts closely scrutinizing differential treatment of the intel-
lectually disabled in light of their differing capacities may have also led him to shrink back from 
carefully testing the city’s permit denial against the particular capabilities of the would-be resi-
dents of the Featherston home. 
214 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–43 (“[The intellectually disabled] range from those whose disability is 
not immediately evident to those who must be constantly cared for. . . . How this large and diver-
sified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a 
task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions 
of the judiciary.”). 
215 Indeed, one can get a sense of the difficulties courts would encounter in credibly making such 
judgments when one reads one of the instances of Justice White himself making just such a 
judgment in the course of reviewing the rationality of the city’s action.  See Id. at 449 (“If there 
is no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other uses that would be permitted in the 
area . . . it is difficult to believe that the groups of mildly or moderately mentally retarded indi-
viduals who would live at 201 Featherston would present any different or special hazard.”). 
216 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2000) (“[T]he incidence and success of facial challenges are 
not . . . governed by any general formula defining the conditions for successful facial challenges. 
Instead, the availability of facial challenges varies on a doctrine-by-doctrine basis and is a func-
tion of the applicable substantive tests of constitutional validity.”). 
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and other municipalities leeway to limit group homes depending on the se-
verity of the would-be residents’ disabilities led him intuitively to favor an 
as-applied approach.  That choice, in turn, logically led him to the more 
record-intensive review he performed in Cleburne. 
Yet at the same time, his seeming hesitancy to rely heavily on the char-
acteristics of the would-be residents of the Featherston home caused his 
“as-applied” analysis to take on a more facial tinge: even if Justice Pow-
ell’s clerk was not completely correct when she stated that nothing in that 
analysis turned on the particular capabilities of the persons who wished to 
occupy that home, his analysis remained heavily focused on the intellectu-
ally disabled as a group.  As noted two paragraphs above, there may have 
been good reason for Justice White’s reticence: after all, his suspect class 
analysis rested in part on concerns that courts could not competently evalu-
ate the needs and appropriate treatment of different groups of intellectually 
disabled persons.  Thus, the coherence of Justice White’s as-applied analy-
sis may have been undermined by his own recognition of courts’ difficulty 
in making the judgments that analysis required. 
Ultimately, whether or not his pending opinion in Spokane Arcades led 
Justice White to insist on an as-applied approach, and even whether or not 
that approach was internally coherent, matters less than the consequences 
of his choice to embrace that approach.  As explained above, that choice 
led him to refer to the record.  In turn, that reference led, logically if not in-
exorably, to the more muscular tone (and reality) of his analysis.  But at the 
same time, such as-applied analysis did not reach full flower, perhaps be-
cause of White’s caution about making the very judgments he cautioned 
courts against trying to make.  Thus, his rational basis analysis took on a 
more facial tone, but retained the reference to the record that implied to 
readers that something more muscular than traditional rational basis review 
was afoot.  As we know, that tone reverberated far beyond that case.217 
IV.  LESSONS FROM A POSSIBLE ACCIDENT 
It is interesting in itself that the Cleburne opinion we know may have 
resulted, at least in part, from the unintended dynamics of the Justices’ in-
teractions, or from their interest in other issues that collaterally, but crucial-
ly, affected Cleburne itself.  Cleburne is an important case that has signifi-
cantly influenced the evolution of the Court’s constitutional doctrine.   
Realizing that it may have been even partially, or possibly, an “accident” 
adds to our understanding of our constitutional history. 
 
217 See supra note 12 (describing the aftermath of Cleburne). 
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But this insight matters also for what it might tell us more generally 
about the Court, the legal doctrines that emanate from it, and the public’s 
understanding of those doctrines.  A striking aspect of Cleburne is that, for 
generalists and non-lawyers, the story it tells is a coherent one.  On this un-
derstanding of the case, the Court began by considering whether the intel-
lectually disabled merited explicitly heightened scrutiny.  After finding at 
least some support for that argument but nevertheless rejecting it,  it then 
(logically, on this telling) considered whether the city’s action was so irra-
tional or infected with animus as to fail rational basis scrutiny.  As one 
might expect on this telling, it conducted that search with the more careful 
eye warranted by the evidence it uncovered during its suspect class inquiry.  
In this more lay understanding of the case, the Court’s sequencing of its 
analysis did not constitute the illogical or (as Justice Marshall charged) il-
legitimate deciding of constitutional questions unnecessary to the resolu-
tion of the case.  Instead, that sequencing made complete sense.218 
The force of this narrative is buttressed by the reasons the Court gave 
for rejecting the intellectually disabled’s claim to explicitly heightened pro-
tection.  As is well known, the majority’s analysis of the suspect class ques-
tion was suffused by anxiety about the Court’s proper role.  It expressed 
concern that courts could not easily distinguish between benign differentia-
tion and invidious mistreatment of the intellectually disabled.219  It also 
worried that intrusive judicial review would dissuade states from treating 
the intellectually disabled differently, even when that differential treatment 
was benign, for example, as with special education.220  More generally, it 
noted the difficult medical and social science issues surrounding the entire 
area, and expressed concern that courts lacked the competence to second-
guess such treatment.221  And, in a final statement of anxiety about the ar-
gument for suspect class status, the Court wondered how, if it granted that 
 
218 Indeed, this sequencing appears to have made sense to specialists as well.  See, e.g., Phan v. Vir-
ginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986) (characterizing Justice Marshall’s dissent as, in turn, 
describing the majority’s “second order rational basis” analysis in Cleburne as “occur[ring] in 
cases in which the law in question approaches, but falls short, of the . . . suspect classifications 
usually triggering strict scrutiny”); cf. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With 
Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 41–46 (2010) (discussing the con-
cept of “acoustic separation,” in which the Court speaks to elites and the general public in ways 
that convey different messages to the two groups). 
219 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–46 (acknowledging the existence of discrimination against the 
intellectually disabled, but refusing to “subject all government action based on that classifica-
tion” to a higher scrutiny merely due to the chance that the action rises above simple differentia-
tion). 
220 See id. at 444–45. 
221 See id. at 442–43 (describing the treatment under the law of the intellectually disabled as a 
“technical matter,” involving myriad medical distinctions, which the legislature, “guided by qual-
ified professionals,” is better-equipped to address than the “perhaps ill-informed . . . judiciary”). 
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status to the intellectually disabled, it could legitimately deny it to a bevy 
of other groups who could claim an analogous history of mistreatment and 
current social subordination.222 
All told, these anxieties do more than buttress the Court’s decision on 
the suspect class issue.  They also reinforce the plausibility of a narrative in 
which insurmountable practical and jurisprudential obstacles prevented the 
Court from granting the intellectually disabled suspect class status as a 
general matter, but which nevertheless gave the Court reason to worry 
about that group’s vulnerability to majoritarian oppression.  In this narra-
tive, the Court addressed that vulnerability through the heightened, but 
more granular, review it performed under the aegis of the rational basis 
standard. 
But that (plausible) story is not the one told by the Justices’ papers.   
Their papers instead reflect a divided Court, a bloc of which was deeply in-
terested in rejecting the appellate court’s suspect class analysis, and which 
was willing to compromise on rational basis analysis in order to secure a 
majority for their more intensely desired result.  The contrast between this 
history—the real story of Cleburne—and its possible readings by persons 
outside the Court reminds us that court opinions, like any text, can take on 
meanings of their own, as readers impose their own assumptions, under-
standings, and order on the content. 
This is as well-known an idea in law as it is in literature.223  In both 
fields, theories of interpretation insist that it is the text that matters, not the 
intentions of the authors who wrote (or, in the case of opinions, Justices 
who joined) that text.224  (To be sure, these theories are not unquestioned; 
indeed, even adherents to such theories might maintain that, while text is in 
fact what matters, evidence of the authors’ intentions can help elucidate 
that textual meaning.)225  In the case of Cleburne, that text tells a seemingly 
 
222 See id. at 445–46 (illustrating the difficulty in distinguishing between prejudice or discrimination 
suffered by the intellectually disabled and, say, the physically disabled or elderly). 
223 See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, THE SACRED WOOD AND MAJOR EARLY ESSAYS 30 (1998) (“Honest criti-
cism and sensitive appreciation is directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry.”). 
224 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 6, at 473 (“Lawyers and historians agree that almost everything we 
need to know about constitutional law is found in the Supreme Court’s published opinions.  In-
ternal Court documents, like Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers, tell us something about the dy-
namics within the Court but relatively little about constitutional law.”).  To be sure, it is possible 
to argue that the meaning of those opinions—that is, the law that emanates from them—can or 
should be derived in part by investigation of the Court’s internal papers, in a way analogous to 
the use of legislative history to determine the meaning of a statutory text.  For a thorough consid-
eration of this possibility, see Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311 (1999). 
225 See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 224 (concluding that, while understandably excluded on structur-
al and institutional grounds, internal “judicial history” could still prove valuable for interpretive 
purposes); cf. E. D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 17 (1967) (claiming the “obvious 
fact” that a reader can never know an author’s subjective intentions “should not be allowed to 
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coherent story about the Justices applying one approach (suspect class 
analysis), and then, when that approach did not satisfactorily dispose of the 
case, turning to another (heightened rationality review).  Indeed, it does so 
in a context where the Court recognizes the force of the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment for suspect class status, finds itself unable to accept that argument, 
but ends up not only ruling for the plaintiffs, but doing so in a way that 
honors that first argument’s core concern with protecting socially-
subordinated groups.  That story may have been an “accident,” as this Arti-
cle has defined that term (that is, as a consequence that was not intended by 
a majority of the Justices).  But it had effect nonetheless. 
If all this is true, then judicial doctrine may be more random than we 
think.  If the need to garner majority support for all aspects of an opinion 
leads the authoring Justice to bob and weave—essentially, to logroll—so as 
to cobble together a majority coalition, then those maneuvers may combine 
to create a product that lacks full majority support for any of its compo-
nents.226  Moreover, when the resulting opinion tells a seemingly coherent 
story—as the Cleburne opinion does—the distortion of the law may be 
even greater.  In other words, when the components of an opinion combine 
to tell such a story, then the text as a whole may carry even more commu-
nicative content than the sum of its parts—even when that content, and in-
deed, even those component parts, lack active majority support.  To the ex-
tent that underlying narrative is embraced by influential consumers of the 
Court’s work-product—for example, by professors who strive to harmonize 
a set of cases into a coherent, understandable doctrine for their students—
the distortion is carried forward and threatens to become “the law” those 
cases “stand for.” 
To be sure, this may not be the full story of Cleburne.  The fact remains 
that there was majority support for Justice White’s rejection of suspect 
class status for the intellectually disabled—at least eventually, when Justice 
Powell finally came around to recognizing the importance of a statement 
from the Court on that issue.227  But the application of more muscular ra-
tional basis review does appear to have been an afterthought—not just an 
afterthought to Justice White, who was prevailed upon to draft that final 
section of the opinion only on the insistence of Justice Powell, but also an 
afterthought to both Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, who appeared to 
 
sanction the overly hasty conclusion that the author’s intended meaning is inaccessible and is 
therefore a useless object of interpretation”). 
226 As two scholars defined it, “logrolling” refers to the practice of “combining of unpopular pro-
posals into one omnibus initiative that will command majority support.”  Robert D. Cooter & 
Michael D. Gilbert, Reply to Hasen and Matsusaka, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 59, 60 (2010). 
227 See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7, 1985); id., Letter 
from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985). 
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prioritize ensuring that the Court remained committed to the initial draft’s 
suspect class analysis.228 
The muscular character of that rational basis review itself may also 
have been not fully intended.  Instead, it may have flowed in part from Jus-
tice White’s insistence on invalidating the city’s action as-applied, rather 
than facially—an insistence that may have led him to rely on the record, 
which in turn suggested to readers that something more than traditional ra-
tional basis review was afoot.  If White’s insistence on as-applied review 
flowed from the impending release of his opinion in Spokane Arcades, then 
we are left to conclude that the happenstance of his other writing assign-
ment ultimately influenced his tone in Cleburne.  The other explanation for 
his insistence—his desire to allow governments maximum leeway to regu-
late the living situations of more profoundly disabled persons—presents an 
even bigger irony.  As noted earlier, if the as-applied nature of his analysis 
pushed him to refer to the record, then his desire to provide government 
with more, not less, room to regulate resulted, ironically, in the more strin-
gent tone of his rational basis analysis.229 
These indicia of accidentalness matter, especially from the vantage 
point of 2017, when Cleburne has come to be understood not just as the 
death knell for suspect class analysis at the Court, but also as a milestone in 
heightened rational basis review.  Today, such review is well-
acknowledged by the lower courts and by commentators, if not by the 
Court itself230 (even if the Court still performs it).  Cleburne really did 
point the way toward that new approach to equal protection.  But in point-
ing toward that direction, the Court may simply have been shooing away a 
fly.  In other words, the overall impact of the Cleburne opinion may consti-
tute the biggest accident of all. 
 
228 It bears repeating that both Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor reaffirmed their joins of Justice 
White’s opinion very quickly after White circulated the new part of his opinion applying rational 
basis analysis.  See supra note 137. 
229 Indeed, as noted earlier, the irony is compounded by the fact that Justice White could not fully 
perform that as-applied analysis, since it would have required him to engage in the judicial line-
drawing between different levels of disability that he had abjured in his suspect class analysis.   
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.  But see supra note 208 (identifying parts of White’s 
opinion that did note the particular degree of disability experienced by the would-be residents of 
the Featherston home). 
230 But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (describing the rational basis review performed in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer as “more 
searching”). 
